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25 October 1985

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INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

PAPER VIEWS AGENDA FOR ASEAN-EEC ECONOMIC TALKS

BK040123 Bangkok THE NATION in English 4 Oct 85 pp 1, 2

[Text] Major global economic issues including the need for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, growing protectionism, unsettling currency situation and world recession, will highlight the EEC-ASEAN economic ministers meeting to be held here later this month.

The conference is expected to stress implications at the national, regional, and international levels, said officials. However, they cautioned against any over-expectation on the outcome of the meeting.

The EEC and ASEAN economic ministers are expected to review the results of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund annual meeting in Seoul.

At the national level, it will hopefully indicate that the situation in the aftermath of the abortive coup has returned to normal. At the regional level, it may chart the course of ASEAN-EC economic cooperation with the cooperation agreement to be reviewed.

At the international level, the joint stand that the two blocs, one grouping six developing countries and the other grouping 10 developed countries, will express over the controversial proposal for the launching of the new round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) have political impacts on the issue at a time when the world is at a juncture between rising protectionism, trade war and worldwide economic recession on one hand and a negotiated new world economic order on the other hand.

The common view on both sides that Europe should do more business in the other region is also high on the agenda of the "brainstorming" session with the major question "how" to approach the matter. The discussion will be part of talks on the ASEAN-EC economic cooperation agreement, concluded in Kuala Lumpur in 1980 and due to expire this year. The review on the agreement, which will be automatically renewed every two years barring objection from any signatory, will chart the course of the region-to-region economic relations and cooperations over the next two years.

In the briefest term, the annotated agenda agreed upon during a Brussels meeting of senior officials from the two groupings early last month covers three broad items: international economic situation, regional economic situation and the cooperation agreement.

Details of the three items of the agenda have yet to be worked out in a series of preparatory meetings from 14-15 October. On the first day senior economic officials from the six ASEAN countries will meet at the Hilton International Hotel, also the venue of the conference, while senior officials from both groupings will meet on the following day.

Among the ministers to attend the session, which is scheduled for 17-18 October after the ASEAN ministers meet among themselves on 16 October morning and the ministers from the two regional groupings have an audience with HM the King on the morning of 16 October, will be Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila acting as chairman of the conference, Industry Minister Chirayu Itsarangkun Na Ayutthaya as spokesman of the conference, Commerce Minister Koson Krairoek, Agriculture Minister Narong Wongwan, EC Commissioner in charge of Southeast Asian Affairs Chaudé Cheysson, West German Economic Minister Martin Bangemann, Secretary of State for External Relations Jean-Michel Baylet from France, British Secretary of State for Trade Paul Channon from Britain and Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Mario Fiore.

From the other ASEAN countries are Trade and Industry Minister Tony Tan and his deputy Lee Hsien Loong from Singapore and Minister of Development Dato Rahman Taib from Brunei.

On 19-20 October, the economic ministers will visit the Thai-Kampuchean border areas and the Eastern Seaboard in an "optional programme" as guests of the Thai government, informed sources told THE NATION.

As far as substance is concerned, the talks on the international economic situation are expected to cover the following issues: a call for an early launching of the new round of multi-lateral trade negotiations (MTN) to restructure the world trade order, the Multi-fibre Arrangement which is due to expire in the middle of next year, commodities and the monetary situation.

The sources said that the joint stand thought ASEAN and EEC economic ministers will express in their joint statement at the end of the meeting on the question of when the MTN should be launched and what should be discussed in the eighth MTN since World War II would have an extent of political impact on the prospects of the holding of MTN.

On commodities, the ASEAN economic ministers are expected to stress the lack of effective mechanism mainly buffer stock funds, to shore up commodities prices. On sugar in particular, the Thai side having Chirayu as an expert on the issue may broach the matter.

CSO:

INDONESIA

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON INDONESIAN PERSONALITIES

[Unless otherwise noted, the following information on Indonesian personalities has been extracted from Indonesian language sources published in Jakarta.]

BRIG GEN SUGITO--The Indonesian National Army Chief of Staff on Friday 9 August will install TNI Brigadier General Sugito (46) as Commander of the Greater Jakarta Military Area, replacing former official TNI Major General Try Sutrisno. Confirmation of the above replacement was explained by Army Chief of Staff General Rudini Tuesday afternoon during a press conference connected with the TNI-AD Leadership Meeting which began Tuesday. Until now, the new official is still Commander of the Air Traffic Combat Command of the Army Strategic Command in Cilodong, East Jakarta. He also holds the position of Commander of the Operation East Timor Command. Brig Gen Sugito, who graduated from the National Military Academy in Magelang in 1961, has from the beginning of his career been with units of the Army Special Forces Command (previously the Army Para Commando Regiment/Kopassandha [Special Forces Command]) so that he was later known by the name "Sugito RPKAD." As an officer of the elite TNI-AD troops, Sugito experienced promotions to various difficult posts. So it was that when first taking off his red beret, the above officer was Defense Attache in a difficult place, that was in Hanoi, Vietnam from 1978 to 1982. After finishing duty in Vietnam, Sugito then received training at the National Defense Institute in 1983. After that for a short time he was Commander of Combat Command II/Army Strategic Command and later becoming Pangkopur Linud [Commander of Combat Command, Airborne] until now. This command may be termed special troops "number two" after the Special Forces Command and is traditionally held by security officers or ex-Red Beret. Throughout his 24-year career there have not been many duties with territorial characteristics because Sugito moved from one combat unit to another combat troop. But like most RPKAD officers, he is flexible enough in his associations and during each combat assignment he also experienced the territorial leadership system well enough. It may be said that for the first time Jakarta is being led by a Red Beret officer. The current Garrison Chief of Staff, TNI Brig Gen Sudarto, is also a RPKAD officer. [Text] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 7 Aug 85 pp 1, 12]

PROF DR DODDY TISNA AMIDJAYA--"May I speak with Mahaputra Doddy...", so go the numerous greetings of voices from the telephone. Prof Dr Doddy Tisna Amidjaya, who answers the telephone, laughs heartily. Certainly he knows the voices on the telephone are the voices of his friends. "There is no Mahaputra Doddy..., the one here is Doddy Tisna Amidjaya," he answers later jokingly. Since it was reported in the papers that the Head of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences received the Mahaputra, Class III medal from President Soeharto in

connection with the fortieth anniversary of the Republic of Indonesia, the telephone jokes as mentioned have arrived from relatives. Born in Garut, West Java on 15 March 1925, he feels extremely happy about the medal. Although he says his work until now has been ordinary. There has not been anything special. But even though this surpassing honor has been presented to him, his attitude is still as before. Friendly, kind and open. Certainly the responsibility on his shoulders since becoming a national personality is increasingly larger. "Just look, if we translate Mahaputra, it means a great prince...", said the former Director General of Higher Education of the Department of Education and Culture when translating what he received. This father of three children, who has completely white hair, may be said to have spent all of his life in the educational field. He is fluent in English, Dutch, German and at one time his Indonesian was "interrupted" with Sundanese. He was the Assistant Dean of Bandung Technical Institute from 1963 to 1968. From that time, he said, he has memories which left a great impression. As the Assistant Dean he had direct connection with academic elements such as lecturers and students. "Essentially, if compared to the army, directly in the field of combat," he explained. Later after taking office as Director General of Higher Education, he came to increasingly understand problems of higher education. Especially that in Indonesia it is difficult to have firm standards to handle the problems of higher education. Thus implementation in the field, where conditions differ, we have to fix by providing relief, he said. After being Director General his career rose again, that is into the most well-known research institute which handles science and knowledge. That is LIPI, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. He actually did not want to differentiate the fields of work which he has held. As a government employee we have "to be prepared for combat" anywhere. The preparedness of a person is a mirror of his success, said Doddy. "Thus if within higher education there are problems which are always found concerning the system, for example, curriculum and the acceptance of students, in LIPI there are also difficulties. As an example, facing detailed matters, because this is research. What I mean is that LIPI has a wider reach," he said. [Excerpts] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 18 Aug 85 pp 1, 2]

BRIG GEN DRS ARDOEL DJABAR--In Semarang last week Police General Anton Soedjarwo installed Brig Gen Drs Abdoel Djabar as Governor of the Police Academy, replacing Brig Gen Drs Roestam Santiko. Previously Abdoel Djabar was Vice Assistant for Security and Order, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, while Roestam Santiko has been transferred to Police Headquarters. The new Governor of the Police Academy, born in Kediri, East Java, is not a stranger to the world of police education. He has been head of the Educational Center of the Police Officers Candidate School in Semarang. [Text] [Jakarta TEMPO in Indonesian 17 Aug 85 p 21]

COL HARSENO--Colonel Harseno, who previously answered as Security Inspector of the Army Inspectorate General, graduated from the National Military Academy in 1961 part of the eighteenth generation and Brig Gen Soedarto will return to TNI-AD headquarters to prepare for his retirement. [Excerpts] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 21 Aug 85 pp 1, 12]

LET GEN RAMBANG TRIANTORO--Lieutenant General Bambang Triantoro was previously Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. He takes office as Chief of Staff for Socio-Political Affairs, replacing the late Let Gen Gunawan Wibisono who died some time ago. Let Gen Bambang Triantoro was born in Surabaya on 7 January 1931 and has been Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff and Command School from 1978 to 1981, Commanding General of Army Kobangdiklat [Instruction, Training and Development Command] 1981-1983, and Deputy KSAD 1983-20 August 1985, now held by Let Gen Try Soetrisno. [Excerpts] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 22 Aug 85 p 12]

LET GEN TRY SUTRISNO--Indonesian National Army Lieutenant General Bambang Triantoro will take office as Chief of Staff for Socio-Political Affairs ABRI, replacing TNI Let Gen Gunawan Wibisono who died not long ago. TNI Let Gen Try Sutrisno was born in Surabaya on 15 November 1935. A graduate of the Army Technical Academy in Bandung 1956-1959, Staff and Command School in Bandung 1972, ABRI Staff and Joint Command, 1977. Assignments he has had are Operation Special Region/Indonesian Islamic Army in Aceh 1957, Operation People's War of the Republic of Indonesia in 1959, Freeing of Irian Barat 1962 and People's Command 1964. Extermination of the 30th of September Movement/Communist Party of Indonesia 1965. Offices he has held are Chief of Staff of Military Region Command XVI/Udayana 1978-1979, Commander of Military Region Command IV/Sriwijaya in Palembang 1979-1982, Pangdam V/Jaya 1982-1985. [Excerpts] [Jakarta SUARA KARYA in Indonesian 22 Aug 85 p 5]

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CSO: 4213/334

LAOS

THAIS ACCUSED OF OBSTRUCTIONISM, ATTACK ON LAOS

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 26 Aug 85 p 3

[Unsigned Article: "What Are Bangkok's Good Intentions for Improving Lao-Thai Relations?"]

[Text] Responding to the official letter of Mr Phoua Sipaseut, LPDR foreign minister, on 1 July 1985 which contained reasonable proposals and initiatives aimed at improving and normalizing relations between the peoples of the two nations, the Thai side has clearly indicated its true intentions concerning the issue of improving Lao-Thai relations, which is an issue of great interest among the Thai and Lao peoples, and for the nations in this region and the world.

Thailand has a habit of saying, "Thailand has always believed in the policy of promoting good relations between Thailand and Laos and in the principle of resolving disputes between the two nations by peaceful means, etc." The Thai were unable to come up with any answer to Mr Phoun Sipaseut's letter of 1 July which clearly pointed out all of the ordinary good intentions and the sincerity of Laos in resolving Lao-Thai relations by peaceful means according to the wishes of the Lao and Thai peoples. One reason for the beautiful-sounding words of Thailand is to save face and to hope to escape from the condemnation of world opinion and from pressure by nations and its friends and also various international organizations, e. g., the United Nations who are in favor of improving and normalizing relations between the peoples of Laos and Thailand. One [reason] they said this was to evade the reasonable proposals of Laos.

We can see that this is because the Thai side has not made any haste for preparations and has not been willing to talk with Laos on solving the problem which touches on the rights and interests of the Lao and Thai peoples. Thailand's scheme was clearly shown in the new nonsensical proposal in the letter of Mr Siddhi Savetsila on 23 July with its statements such as "must create an atmosphere...", "must have talks at the local level first...", "must stop accusing Thailand...", etc. Based on past experience in Lao-Thai relations and also according to international customs, talks on the local level have never solved any problem between the two nations. The Thai side, of course, are the ones who are not bringing about an atmosphere for talks, because a number of Thai troops even now are still occupying the three Lao villages. Thai propaganda organizations, radio, and newspapers are always assailing the LPDR. As

a result, Mr Siddhi's proposals are unreasonable and have destroyed the just interests of the Lao and Thai peoples. Relations between the Lao and Thai peoples are at an undesirable stage.

The Lao people wish only to resolve quickly and normalize Lao-Thai relations immediately and by peaceful means according to the 1979 joint statement of Laos and Thailand. Otherwise, the situation will drag on longer, which is harmful and increases the damage and leads to the dismantling of the fraternal friendships of the peoples of the two countries. Previous and present Thai proposals, for example, to have talks at the local level first can solve nothing and will only drag out the problem of Lao-Thai relations. Thailand itself is well aware that only government-level talks will resolve the issue of Lao-Thai relations.

These acts of the Thai do no good towards solving the Lao-Thai problem. They only clearly confirm even further the true intentions of Thailand towards the peace-loving people in Thailand and in progressive nations of the world, which are to drag on the problem of improving Lao-Thai relations and thus to increase tensions and threaten the peace and stability of the region.

9884

CSO: 4206/183

LAOS

'TALK' REBUTS THAI CHARGES ON 'SLANDERS'

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Aug 85 p 3

["Talking Together" Column: "Unreasonable Accusations Are Not a Path to Talks"]

[Text] Thailand has often said, "Laos must stop accusing the Thai and raising issues unrelated to the promotion of bilateral relations between the two nations as obstacles to the initiation of talks." These comments are all distortions of the facts with the intention of accusing Laos and hoping to use them to obstruct talks and to delay improving Lao-Thai relations.

Everyone knows and understands very well that Laos, the LPDR, is an independent country with the rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is a member of the United Nations and other organizations and [properly adheres] to the principles and international customs of the region and of the world. By [professing] its foreign policy of peace, friendship, and socialism, the role and the influence of the LPDR figures prominently in the international arena. It unceasingly continues and promotes its heritage of special solidarity, great friendship, and militant relations among the peoples of the three fraternal nations in Indochina, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, who have victoriously passed the test of fire over the 30 years of struggle to resist the French and the American imperialists. This has become a decisive element of the revolutionary victory in each country. The LPDR is able to maintain gloriously its stability and is strongly advancing along the brilliant path of socialism, and is strongly taking part in defending the forward outpost of world socialism in Southeast Asia and in protecting the peace and stability of this region and the world. Laos and the Lao revolution are not alone. All the acts of the international and regional reactionaries that violate the rights and sovereignty of the LPDR and that obstruct the peaceful construction of the nation of the Lao people of ethnic groups will also effect the security of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. This is the principle of the relations indicated by the three nations in the statement of the summit of the three Indochinese nations in February 1982. However, Laos-Vietnam and Vietnam-Cambodia relations have no effect on Lao-Thai relations. As for the Cambodian issue, we are always involved with solving problems in the region whether we like it or not. We must raise the issue for discussion in order to solve the problem on the basis of the principle of equality as proposed by the three Indochinese nations in the announcement of the conference of their

foreign ministers on 18 January of this year and which was also emphasized again in the conference that has just ended recently. The solution of all problems that involve Lao-Thai relations must be based on what was contained in the Lao-Thai joint statement of 1979. When Thai troops were still occupying the three Lao villages, Laos was taking the initiative in appointing a government delegation to go to Bangkok for talks. When Thailand unilaterally cut off talks, Laos made many proposals to revive them. It was only when Thailand refused that Laos then raised the issue in the United Nations Security Council. According to international custom this is quite common. An example of something that was done previously was the Khao Pravihan issue which could not be solved between Thailand and Cambodia, and which was brought to the World Court in 1962. Thus, the actions of Laos both previously as well as now are quite correct. We have never accused Thailand, and the issues that Laos has raised are all true and are done with the sincere intent to improve and normalize Lao-Thai relations, according to our intention in the joint Lao-Thai statement of 1979.

Therefore, when Thailand said that "Laos must stop accusing Thailand and stop bringing up other issues," what Thailand means are the issues of Cambodia and Vietnam. However, what will the Thai people and the world masses think when Thailand considers Pol Pot's routed army and the genocidal criminals as a main issue? This is additional evidence for the true nature of the selfish lies of Thailand which looks for ways to accuse and slander so that they can force Laos to agree with obstructing and dragging out improvement in Lao-Thai relations in order to realize the dark schemes of the Thai ultrarightist reactionaries who follow the advice of the Beijing reactionaries in maintaining tensions and the threat to world peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

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CSO: 4206/183

LAOS

'TALK' HITS THAI UNRESPONSIVENESS TO PHOUN LETTER

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 27 Aug 85 p 3

["Talking Together" Column: "The Thai Proposals Are Meant To Delay Improvement in Lao-Thai Relations"]

[Text] Their proposal "to have discussions by representatives of the two countries at the local level first" is one of many Thai proposals in response to the sincere Lao proposals which were clearly stated in the letter of the LPDR Foreign Minister Mr Phoun Sisavat on 1 July. Superficially it appears as if Thailand has truly good intentions to solve the issue of Lao-Thai relations, but when we examine them closely we see immediately that these Thai proposals are not at all sincere regarding rapid normalization of Lao-Thai relations. On the contrary, the Thai proposals are meant to evade and prolong the problem mentioned.

Everyone knows that the fine relations between the peoples of these two nations which have existed since ancient times are being seriously shaken because the Thai authorities have allowed the Thai ultrarightist reactionaries carry out their schemes to destroy peace along the Thai-Lao border, and to trample on what was contained in the two joint Lao-Thai statements that both governments signed in 1979. This has increasingly been the cause of anger and harm to the Thai and Lao peoples. As yet the local authorities of both countries have been unable to solve the problems, e.g., the issue of the three Lao villages in Paklai District, Sayaboury Province. This is one of many problems where Thailand has violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the LPDR. The Thai side itself already knows this. Prior to this, while the Thai troops were occupying the Lao villages, Laos was taking the initiative in appointing a governmental delegation to go to Bangkok for talks. However, the talks failed because of the insincerity of Thailand. This was clearly demonstrated in the unilateral announcement to stop the talks by Thailand. When the governmental level talks for the purpose of solving the problem could not lead anywhere, how can the local level talks as proposed by the Thai be able to solve the problem mentioned and more important problems? This is only one of many problems that need to be solved together, in particular the trade issue, e.g., when the asphalt was halted by the Thai in the port of Klong Toei. The Japanese and Lao governments have already discussed this with the Thai government, but as yet nothing has been done. If this is the case, how can local level talks solve what the Thai call the "refugee problem," the problem of electricity sales between the two countries, and other problems which are under the rights and

and powers of the governments of both countries to solve in order to quickly improve and normalize Lao-Thai relations as expressed by the Lao-Thai joint statements signed in 1979. Local level talks will succeed only on the basis of having talks and agreement between the two governments in order to work out the details for travelling back and forth and for relations. Thus, we can clearly see that the Thai proposals announced in response to the official letter of Mr Phoun Sisavat on 1 July lacked sincerity and were meant only to delay any improvement in Lao-Thai relations. If the Thai sincerely wish to actually revive and promote fraternal relations with us as they once said, they should quickly meet the Lao proposal by opening government-level talks to resolve various unfinished problems in Lao-Thai relations. Delaying on the talks does no good and is a good opportunity for the Thai reactionaries who hope to create tensions and to ruin Lao-Thai relations gradually. The incidents of 9 and 17 August are examples of incidents created by the Thai ultra-rightist reactionaries in the past.

9884

CSO: 4206/183

LAOS

BRIEFS

SAVANNAKHET WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP--Savannakhet is a large and important province of our nation with 21,700 square kilometers and over 500,000 people, more than half of which are women. Since 1975 when it was organized, the women's association existed only in some districts, Phan, Sepone, Nong, Angkham, Na Gnom, half of Atsaphangthong, and Tha Pangthong. There were no members of the women's association at all in Outhoumphon, Champhon, Songkhon, and Khanthabouli. In 1975 there were only 448 women's association units throughout Savannakhet Province, with a total of only 4,730 members. However, the figure has now grown to 4,906 units with a total of 43,589 members, or 27.86 percent of 156,448 women who are at least 17 years old. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 26 Aug 85 p 2] 9884

VIENTIANE INTERNATIONAL, DOMESTIC TRADE--Vientiane Province trade has been wonderfully improved and expanded. There are 36 large state stores with indispensable goods to meet the demands of the people. In the first half of this year, although there were some difficulties in organizing, planning, communications, and transportation, the provincial trade cadres were able to purchase many tens of tons of forest and ricefield products, e.g., resin, rattan, benzoin, "peuak meuak", "peuak hat", cutch, etc., from the people, valued at almost 16 million kip. In addition to purchasing, the Vientiane Province trade cadres also sent construction materials, e.g., zinc, steel nails, and nearly 100 types of other household items to the people valued at 115 million kip. All this demonstrated the relations between the people and the government in improving and expanding the trade network. Vientiane Province now also exchanges goods with Luang Prabang Province, and Sayaboury, Oudomsai, and Xieng Khouang. Vientiane Province also engages in fairly extensive exchanging of goods with its twin province Hai Hung of the SRV. [Excerpt] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Aug 85 p 2] 9884

SAVANNAKHET CO-OPS, KHAMMOUAN FOOD PRODUCTION--Since early in 1985 the people of ethnic groups throughout Savannakhet Province have been changing from private, scattered production to organize an additional 487 agricultural co-op units in order to become a foundation for socialist collective production. This brought the number of agricultural co-ops throughout the province to 625 units with 41,712 families, 248,930 people, and a total cultivation area of 55,118 hectares. On the average the agricultural co-op families comprise 50.35 percent of the total of 82,836 families that engage in production. The number of people is 50.08 percent of the total 497,016 people, and the ricefields amount to 65.52 percent of the 84,114 hectares throughout the province.

In the past 10 years gross production throughout Khammouan Province has increased approximately 75,900 tons. In comparison with the 1976 figures the per capita income of the province has increased approximately 29.4 percent. Gross production for agriculture and forestry has almost doubled. The cultivation area for wet rice has increased from 37,200 hectares in 1976 to 38,400 hectares in 1985. Rice production increased from 31,620 tons in 1976 to 107,520 tons in 1985. [Excerpt] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 27 Aug 85 p 1] 9884

CSO: 4206/183

MALAYSIA

GERAKAN TO SUSPEND ACTIVITY OF MCA-GERAKAN JOINT COUNCIL

Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA in Chinese 5 Aug 85 p 4

[Text] Dr Lim Keng Yaik, national president of the Malaysian People's Movement [GERAKAN], said today that pending the settlement of power struggle within the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA], his party will suspend all activities of the MCA-GERAKAN Joint Council.

At a news conference held after a GERAKAN Central Committee meeting today, Dr Lim said that the above-mentioned decision was a reaffirmation of the committee's resolution passed on 22 June.

He stressed that the GERAKAN party wants to avert the MCA infighting from getting more complicated. Hence the decision.

"The GERAKAN does not want to be involved in the MCA's internal fighting. That's why we must wait until everything is over," he explained.

He added: "When the time comes around, MCA and GERAKAN will hold meaningful talks for mutual benefit. We don't want to discuss matters with any faction of the MCA."

He expressed hope that the MCA would solve its problem as soon as possible.

9300

CSO: 4205/36

MALAYSIA

LIM KIT SIANG CLAIMS MCA HAS LOST RIGHT TO SELECT OWN LEADERS

Selangor SIN CHEW JI' POH MALAYSIA in Chinese 8 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] Lim Kit Siang, secretary general of the Democratic Action Party [DAP], said today that Prime Minister Dr Mahathir's statement at Bukit Mertajam, Penang yesterday carries a special significance to the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA], an implication that the MCA has lost its right to select its own leaders.

Lim Kit Siang said: Mahathir's statement clearly shows that a forthcoming National Front's supreme council meeting, scheduled for the 17th of this month, will become the main basis to discuss which personage will lead the MCA henceforth, and MCA's future as well as its future direction.

Mr Lim was holding a news conference in Seremban at noon today.

He quoted Prime Minister Mahathir as saying in Bukit Mertajam as follows: All leaders of National Front member parties must be prepared to accept the decision of the majority of the membership. This is the formal foundation for a party or government administration.

Mr Lim added: "This is, in fact, a generally-accepted reality. The leadership of the National Front is in fact the leadership of the United Malays National Organization [UMNO]. The Front's main members are also born out of the UMNO, leaving an impression that the National Front's supreme council is nothing but a rubber stamp of UMNO's supreme council."

Mr Lim continued: In the past the National Front has never convened a meeting of its member parties to discuss policy matters. On this score it has always acted arbitrarily, convoking a meeting just for the sake of formality, if at all. Now the National Front plans to make an arbitrary decision on the fate of the MCA party.

"What makes people feel sad is that 40 months ago the MCA bragged that it won the Chinese support in the 1982 general election and thus it scored a political breakthrough for the Malaysian Chinese.

"We cannot help asking: What did the MCA mean by scoring a political breakthrough? Is it the surrendering of its independence and initiative, of its leadership and the direction of its struggle?

"What makes people sick at heart is the bickering and the quarreling within the MCA. Now the Tan Koon Swan faction, which claims that his rival faction, headed by Neo Yee Pan, dares not stand up before the UMNO or fight for the Chinese interests in the cabinet, has publicly welcomed the existence of such a situation.

"It is no wonder that in the past 40 months, the rights and interests of the Chinese have been eroded further, notwithstanding MCA's claim of having made a political breakthrough.

"Datuk Lee Kim Sai, as leader of the Lim Koon Swan faction, has been self-professing to be a national hero and shouting 'Return to us our national self-respect.' Is all this the way Tan Koon Swan and Lee Kim Sai want to 'retrieve the self-respect of the Chinese nationals?'" , Lim Ki: Siang concluded.

9300

CSO: 4205/36

MALAYSIA

CYSM LEADER ON ISLAMIC PARTY ACCEPTING CHINESE 'CHIEF OF STATE'

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 30 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] In a recent press interview, Tee Ann Chuan, leader of the Chinese Youth Solidarity Movement [CYSM], commented on acceptance of a Chinese "chief of state" by the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party [PAS]. A gist of remarks follows:

During a friendly dialogue meeting between the PAS and members of the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA] in Kota Bharu the other day, Nik Abdul Aziz, chairman of PAS Religious Scholars Council and of Kelantan State joint committee, stressed that if a Chinese leader does not violate Islamic creed and canon, his party will definitely accept him as chief of state.

The acceptance of a Chinese leader to become our chief of state by the PAS is an accurate, reasonable way of doing things, which is worthy of praise. Just as Nik Abdul Aziz has correctly remarked, every qualified person can be elected to become a leader.

However, the CYSM disagrees with the PAS' narrow condition that religious belief constitutes one of the bases for accepting a nominee to become chief of state. This would be unrealistic and a religious bias.

The PAS should handle religious matters and political affairs separately. We should know that if we mix them together, a lot of disputes will crop up. The recent event happening in our country, in which Muslims accused one another of being "infidels," and the perennial war going on in Middle East Islamic countries are two cases in point.

Therefore, the acceptance or nonacceptance of a chief of state should not be contingent upon any religious qualifications. As we are living in a multiracial, multireligion country, the PAS should have a broader perspective in treating religious problems and in learning to respect and accept other religions.

The CYSM agrees that the PAS and Chinese civic and political organizations should hold more dialogues and forums to learn more about one another in political thinking and other opinions.

Finally, Tee Ann Chuan appealed to Chinese society to adopt a prudent attitude in dealing with the PAS' word and deed in its effort to curry favor with the Chinese community, because up till now we cannot be sure whether the Islamic party is merely revising its propaganda strategy or shifting its political policy.

MALAYSIA

PROPER HANDLING OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS, IMPORT OF LABOR URGED

Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA in Chinese 1 Aug 85 p 26

[Editorial: "Illegal Immigrants and Import of Labor"]

[Text] In recent years the problem of illegal immigrants and import of foreign laborers has widely attracted attention and evoked discussions among various circles throughout the land. However, up to now this issue is bogged down in a controversial stage, and no proper solution has been found.

As we see it, the main reason for the government intention to import foreign laborers is because our country is short of manpower in plantation and construction industries. To solve this problem, it is even possible that our government might legalize foreign laborers who have illegally entered our country.

A survey made by the Malaysian Federation of Plantation Unions reveals that the shortage of plantation workers today is more serious than in 1983, causing a loss to plantation industry of M\$92.5 million last year. Of the figure, M\$75.77 million represents the value of unharvested estate produce. Areas hardest hit by labor shortage are Johore, Selangor, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang--in that order.

Of course, any enterprise faced with a labor shortage phenomenon is likely to suffer some degree of losses. Plantation industry is no exception. The main thing is that, in appraising such a problem, the authorities should consider many-sided factors, including wages and working conditions, instead of merely viewing it from the viewpoint of labor shortage; otherwise, it would be impossible to obtain the correct answer to the labor shortage in the related industries. Pending an overall research and investigation proving that there is indeed a serious labor shortage in our country, the government should prudently and meticulously treat the problem of legalizing foreign laborers who have entered our country in illegal ways and means.

The interim report of the Fourth Malaysia Plan, which was published last year, disclosed that our unemployment rate reached 6 percent, representing 330,000 jobless people. The report forecast that the unemployment rate will rise further in the years to come. Before deciding to import labor,

the government must necessarily take the problem of our hundreds of thousand unemployed Malaysians into consideration.

It must be pointed out that to a great extent, importing foreign laborers and legalizing others who have illegally landed on our shore will affect job opportunities of our nationalities, working conditions and our nation's economic reconstruction.

On this score, let us learn from the experience of industrialized countries. Before absorbing foreign labor, European and American countries have considered the laborers' possible impact on the nations' economic reconstruction and imposed strict restrictions accordingly.

As a matter of fact, a section of illegal Indonesian immigrants have in recent years been found to be actively engaged in robberies, violating the law and committing crimes in our country, threatening the lives and property of our citizens. If these criminal offenses are not halted in time, the problem of domestic crime will worsen and cause serious unimaginable consequences.

As our domestic crime problem has gone from bad to worse, the government should adopt strict measures to control illegal immigrants. To "legalize" illegal immigrants at this stage would be tantamount to breeding "rascals." This is really an unwise move.

According to press report, Indonesia's Manpower Minister Admiral Sudono on 29 July divulged that this year Indonesia will dispatch 60,000 workers to Saudi Arabia and Malaysia.

We hope that our government, in the interests of our nationals and common benefit, would listen to the opinions of the people and political circles and appropriately handle the problem of Indonesian illegal immigrants and import of foreign laborers.

9300

CSO: 4205/36

NEW ZEALAND

LABOR PARTY SUPPORT GAINS IN OPINION POLL

HKD21558 Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 27 Sep 85 p 6

[Text] Labor now commands majority support for the first time since the election last year, according to a Neylen-Eyewitness News opinion poll.

Asked on September 14 how they would vote if an election was held immediately, half of the people who had a preference said Labor, a 4-percent rise since the previous poll.

Support for National had dropped back 4 percent to 40 percent, while the Democratic Party and the New Zealand Party stayed the same at 6 percent and 5 percent, respectively.

On performance ratings, the Government rose in four areas, including overall Government performance, handling of the economy, and its record in dealing with inflation. Approval of the proposals for a goods and services tax rose significantly.

But approval of the government's record on unemployment dropped by three points to 47 percent.

Public opinion was almost evenly split over the Government's handling of the ANZUS row, with 46 percent approving, 45 percent disapproving, and 9 percent with no opinion.

CSO: 4200/28

NEW ZEALAND

BRIEFS

HIGH COMMISSIONER TO TONGA--A former ambassador in Bahrain, Mr Graeme Ammundsen, is to be New Zealand's next high commissioner to Tonga. Announcing the appointment today, the Prime Minister, Mr Lange, said Mr Ammundsen will take up his position in November, replacing Ms Priscilla Williams. Both are career diplomats. Mr Ammundsen's previous posts include Apia, New York, and Rarotonga. He was High Commissioner in Honiara from 1978 to 1980, and charge d'affaires in Tehran from 1980 to 1981. [Text] [Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 26 Sep 85 p 3]

CSO: 4200/28

PHILIPPINES

DEFENSE MINISTER ENRILE ASSESSES INSURGENCY SITUATION

HK020845 Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 1 Oct 85 p 30

[Text] Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile said yesterday that in some areas of the country, the government was losing out to the dissidents more by default than by capitulation.

Enrile also told Quezon City Rotarians that in this year alone, about 50 percent of all labor mass actions have been initiated by communist front organizations.

Lately, however, he said that underground influence in the labor sector has been perceptibly waning.

He said the communists are now engaged in sabotage operations against industrial firms and vital public utilities to disrupt the economy and to exacerbate the current economic crisis to the "detriment of our working men whose interests the communist movement purportedly protects and upholds."

The communists have also stepped up the liquidation of local government functionaries and key professionals like media men not only to create a power vacuum in the rural areas but to intimidate the institutions that are necessary for the stability of the government.

All these efforts are part of a sustained and deliberate program of destabilization and mass disorientation staged by the underground movement, its political cadres and its armed regulars, he said.

Beyond anything else, Enrile emphasized, the power and authority of democratic government must be clearly visible and felt in the lives of the people.

"As I have consistently said to our government officials all over the land in the course of our dialogues with them, we must make sure that on a day-to-day basis, our local and national instrumentalities are in close contact with the people, serving the interests of our people and providing for their safety and welfare," he said.

CSO: 4200/29

PHILIPPINES

CHARGES FILED IN KILLING OF SULU VICE GOVERNOR

HK031237 Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 2 Oct 85 pp 1, 11

[Text] PC (Philippine Constabulary) authorities have filed charges of multiple murder and attempted murder against 17 persons, including two policemen, in connection with the ambush-slaying of Sulu Vice Governor Alano Maldisa and three of his bodyguards last September 23.

The charges were filed by the PC Sulu Constabulary Command before the municipal trial court of Jolo. Only nine of the suspects were identified.

The accused are Datu Halun Mohammad, Commander Akim Buklasan, Minyard Hajidul Arah, Mjali Hajidul Arah, Akili Buklasan and Hali Buklasan; Pfc. Gavler Ijasan and Patrolman Jaharun Arah, both of the Jolo police station.

The eight others were identified only as John Does.

A report reaching Camp Aquinaldo said only the two policemen have been arrested and disarmed. The rest were at large.

They are now the object of a big manhunt, according to Brig Gen Carlos Aguilar, PC Region 9 commander.

Vice Governor Maldisa and three of his bodyguards were killed in an ambush by heavily armed men in downtown Jolo on September 23.

The victims were on board a police jeep cruising along Martinez Street in Jolo when the ambushers opened fire.

The ambush was believed to be an offshoot of a political and business rivalry between two feuding families in the province.

CSO: 4200/29

PHILIPPINES

MILITARY CONFIRMS 21 CHILDREN HURT IN ARMY, NPA CLASH

HK021429 Hong Kong AFP in English 1416 GMT 2 Oct 85

[Text] Davao, Philippines, Oct 2 (AFP)--Twenty-one children were wounded when a grenade hit a schoolroom amid heavy fighting between troops and communist guerrillas near this southern city, officials confirmed today.

Regional military chief Brigadier General Jaime Echeverria and Tagum Town Mayor Prospero Estabillo said 21 children were wounded yesterday as army troops fought some 50 New People's Army (NPA) guerrillas at a primary school near Tagum town.

Two of the children sustained serious shrapnel wounds as the combatants hurled grenades at each other using M-79 grenade launchers. One of them hit the school building, the officials added.

The general did not say if there were casualties among the combatants.

Tagum is some 900 kilometers (540 miles) southeast of Manila in Southern Mindanao Island, the current focus of the 16-year-old guerrilla war by the armed wing of the banned Communist Party of the Philippines.

Brig Gen Echeverria told reporters the soldiers were pursuing the rebels who burned a private delivery van loaded with medicines nearby and engaged the guerrillas in a 10-minute gunbattle before the rebels fled.

The children were taken to hospitals, he said.

CSO: 4200/29

PHILIPPINES

BROADCASTERS CLAIM NPA ASSASSINATION, IMPLICATE OTHERS

Quezon City VERITAS in English 22 Sep 85 pp 5, 8

[Article by Eileen G. Mangubat: "Bizarre Twist"; "A Murder Turns Into a Communist Witch-hunt"]

[Text]

TWO radio broadcasters, who claimed to be self-proclaimed communist party members and now under military protection, have brought forward a bizarre solution to the December murder of Radio dyLA commentator Vicente Villordon.

In sworn statements to the fiscal of Cebu, dyHP newscaster Greg Nilles, 43, and dyRF Radio talent Roy Maribao, 27, confirmed what the military had long been saying about Villordon's death -- that Villordon was liquidated by members of the New People's Army (NPA) Mindanao Commission (KOMMID).

What is bizarre, however, is the admission by both mediamen that they and another media colleague, *Cebu Daily Advocate* columnist Angel Libre, Sr. who is still at large, took part in the plot to kill Villordon.

The late commentator co-hosted "Labor Patrol," a program which regularly attacked the Opposition and the CPP. Libre was allegedly the head of an "intelligence unit" of which Nilles and Maribao were members. Together they confessed to have planned the murder of Villordon by getting sketches of his office and studying his movements.

With murder charges filed against them and five suspected NPA Sparrow members, the case, however, is still far from being closed. The radio broadcasters' affidavits suggest they will be used as state witnesses in the near future.

Implicated in the Nilles-Maribao affidavits are 15 other Cebu mediamen (a mix of newscasters and radio talents) who were also mentioned as being involved in the communist underground movement in Cebu.

The affair has turned into a witch hunt of sorts, pointing to media-man's alleged membership in one communist committee or another.

Several mediamen, whose friends' names were mentioned in the affidavits, have been advised by their families to resign or at least "take a vacation" until the controversy blows over.

In one radio station where news of the Nilles-Maribao confessions first broke out, employees, many of whom were named, became suspicious of one another. Some even openly confronted friends of being military spies.

There are strong suspicions that Nilles, who spent six months as a political detainee in Negros Oriental in 1972, had become a "deep-penetration agent" (DPA) fielded by the military after his release.

Opposition Members of Parliament Nenita Cortes-Daluz, Antonio Cuenco, and Marcelo Fernan of Cebu, first warned of the possibility after they were told

by a top NISA official that of the three mediamen to be charged, one was their man -- or words to that effect.

The September 9 NISA press release disclosing "Intelligence Project Aguila" also supports the suspicion. Aguila was described as an operation to stop the entry of KOMMID, CIP elements from Mindanao to Cebu. The statement said the intelligence community will be forced to surface its "infiltration agent" in order to prosecute the guilty.

"The NISA asset in a signed and legally sworn statement to the City Fiscal of Cebu, cited the names of there in the media who are deeply involved in the underground movement and those who are supporting the movement."

The agent, however, is not named.

Nilles refused to answer questions probing into his NISA connection. He confirmed that the contents of his sworn statement was not given under duress.

CSO: 5600/4304

PHILIPPINES

BUDGET DEFICIT PEGGED AT 5.6 BILLION PESOS

HK020911 Manila BUSINESS DAY in English 1 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Rigoberto D. Tiglao]

[Text] The government's budget deficit has hit P [pesos] 5.6 billion in the second week of September, close to the P6.2-billion ceiling the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has imposed for the entire year.

Because of this huge, unexpected difference in government spendings and revenues, BUSINESS DAY sources close to the Finance Ministry claimed that the government has firmed up its position in the ongoing negotiations with the IMF for the release of the Fund's third credit tranche, that the maintenance of the P6.2-billion ceiling is unrealistic and will only derail the economic stabilization program.

This decision was made in the meeting last September 18 called by President Marcos with Prime Minister Cesar Virata and other Cabinet members in Malacanang.

The sources disclosed that failure of the government to reach an agreement with the IMF on the budget deficit target was the major reason why the so-called performance review by the fund could not be completed. "Completion" of the performance review—which means that the government has reached an agreement with the IMF on the monetary and fiscal targets for the end of the year—is required before the Fund can release its third credit tranche amounting to 106 million special drawing rights (\$110 million).

The sources explained that the government about a month ago expected the IMF staff to agree to its request that the end-year budget deficit ceiling be raised to P8.7 billion. The government expected that with the IMF staff's agreement on the revised deficit ceiling, the second performance review would be considered completed and the Fund's executive board would approve the release of the third tranche in its meeting last September 25.

However, the Fund's staff instead informed the government that it needs more time to evaluate the request and that it will present its evaluation of the proposed revision in the budget deficit ceiling during the annual IMF-World Bank meeting in Seoul, South Korea in the second week of this month.

The IMF management, the sources claimed, was hesitant to agree with the request since they felt that the budgetary restraint in the past year actually was one of the major factors that enabled the government to reduce inflation. Furthermore, the IMF management felt that allowing the budget deficit to expand will result in inflationary pressure at a period when the government is still pressed to convince the local business community that the downturn in inflation can be maintained.

The data given to the IMF by the Finance Ministry and the Budget Ministry indicated that without any drastic contraction in the level of expenditures or without any surge in government revenues, the budget deficit for the year will hit P16.17 billion. Budget Minister Manuel S. Alba could not be reached for comment on the data despite efforts by BUSINESS DAY since Friday to do so.

One of the major factors that messed up the government's projections on the budget deficit this year was the peso-dollar exchange rate. The sources said the exchange rate was projected by the Finance Ministry in March (during the IMF's first performance review) to hit a level of P20:\$1 by the middle of the year. The peso-dollar rate, however, has been maintained at roughly the P18.60:\$1 level. While this contributed to the downturn in inflation, government revenues from import duties and from the 1 percent foreign exchange transaction tax were lower than projected since these taxes are computed on the basis of the peso equivalent of the dollar values involved. Furthermore, imports for the year were lower than expected as a result of the high peso interest rates that dampened business activity.

However, the government technically has not violated the terms of its standby arrangement with the IMF despite its P5.6-billion budget deficit as of mid-September, a level close to the P6.2-billion end-year limit. In the first place, the quantitative performance criteria so far agreed upon with the IMF involved monetary and fiscal criteria applicable only up to the end-July limits. The ceiling on the budget deficit actually was translated into performance criteria in terms of end-July limits on net domestic borrowings of all government entities, including public corporations (P8.4 billion) and Central Bank credit to the Philippine National Bank (P4.9 billion). The government came very close, but did not exceed, these ceilings.

The sources disclosed that, even if the IMF agrees to a budget deficit for this year of P8.7 billion, the government will have to make a major effort to increase revenues since expenditures so far are very low. They claimed that the government is considering maintaining the 1 percent foreign exchange transaction tax even with the implementation of the turnover tax system tentatively scheduled for November.

CSO: 4200/29

PHILIPPINES

MANILA TO DISCUSS REORGANIZING BANKS AT SEOUL IMF MEETING

HK030915 Manila BUSINESS DAY in English 2 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Rigoberto Tiglao]

[Text] The government will formally negotiate with the World Bank for a \$250 million loan to support the reorganization of state banks and corporations during the World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) annual meeting in Seoul, Korea which starts next week.

If the negotiations proceed smoothly and if the Philippines succeeds in getting a commitment from the World Bank, the government will start implementing the restructuring program--particularly the plan to merge the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)--by next month, monetary sources disclosed.

The restructuring plan for government financial institutions and corporations will be incorporated into the economic adjustment program covering the period up to the end of the year to be approved by the IMF, also during the Seoul meeting. Implementation of the plan will be one of the so-called "qualitative performance criteria" for the subsequent drawdowns on the IMF facility, which means that failure of the government to implement the program may mean a suspension by the Fund of its standby credit facility.

An appraisal mission from the World Bank sent to the Philippines has already completed its evaluation of the restructuring program early last month. Despite statements from top officials of the PNB and DBP that they are opposing the merger plan, sources said Prime Minister Cesar Virata has already ordered the two banks to prepare their personnel recommendations for the merger.

A ranking official of the PNB said the merger will mean the retrenchment of about 50 percent of the present staff of the two government banks.

One of the critical aspects of the merger plan, which is still under discussion, is the role the Social Security System (SSS) will be playing. The SSS has been practically propping up the two tottering banks with placements amounting to about P13 billion. Both the IMF and the World Bank have criticized what they termed as the "privileged use" by state financial

institutions of the deposits of the national government and its agencies. A ranking government official told BUSINESS DAY that the World Bank has "suggested" that only 25 percent of existing SSS deposits in PNG and DBP be placed in the surviving bank, which will be the PNB. The SSS however, disagrees with the proposal, on grounds that the placements in the surviving bank will be on sounder footing since the surviving bank will be a "clean bank." This refers to the fact that the government plan involves transferring the non-performing accounts of the two banks into a new institution, referred to in jest by monetary authorities as the GDU, for "garbage disposal unit."

The new loan from the World Bank, while similar to its so-called program loans, will represent a new Bank policy for loans to developing countries, an official close to the Bank explained. The World Bank's previous policy was to channel its loans through "conduit" institutions, such as DBP and PNB, or to strictly earmark them for certain projects. However, studies by the World Bank showed that the conduit institutions worldwide have become bankrupt.

"The Bank has learned that money will seek its own level whatever controls are put up," the source explained. So instead of channeling loans through conduit institutions or extending project-tied loans, the current World Bank policy is simply to extend the loans to a government which is not bound by the loan terms to disburse the loan proceeds for any specific purpose. However, the government will be required to implement a reform program stipulated in the loan terms.

The \$25 million loan from the World Bank will be such a type of loan, with the government mainly committing to undertake a financial reform program. Aside from the merger of PNB and DBP, the program calls for the establishment of an industrial bank. To be majority owned by private banks, this new bank will concentrate on long-term lendings to industry.

CSO: 4200/29

PHILIPPINES

HISPANIC BLOC WORK OUT STAND ON IMF AT MANILA MEETING

HK031303 Hong Kong AFP in English 1017 GMT 3 Oct 85

[Text] Manila, Oct 3 (AFP)--The Philippines and other Hispanic financial bloc members are seeking to modify and adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on debtor countries, official sources said here today.

The bloc's finance ministers and central bank heads forged their stand at a closed-door meeting here this week in preparation for the IMF-World Bank Governors' Meeting in South Korea starting Tuesday, the sources close to Premier Cesar Virata added.

The bloc, which holds the bulk of the developing world's outstanding foreign debt, groups Spain, Latin America and the Philippines, which was under Spanish colonial rule for over three centuries ending in 1898.

Mr Virata, who is to lead the Philippines delegation to the Seoul talks, summed up the bloc's stand in an unpublished address Tuesday at the meeting, a transcript of which was made available today.

"The basic strategy that has been evolved to address the present debt crisis is an ad hoc approach," he said.

"Until recently, this has been much applauded in the financial capitals of the world. However, disquieting developments of the recent period have raised concerns over the viability of such an approach," he added.

In particular, economic growth in the United States "shows signs of faltering" without any expectation of more vigorous expansion elsewhere.

As a result, export growth in developing countries is expected to drop to 1.5 percent in 1985 from 8.5 percent in 1984, while primary commodity prices other than oil may decline by nine percent, the official said.

Mr Virata said the IMF approach "has contributed to the emergence of these threats," and that developing countries suffered from the "vicious cycle" of increasing production and lower prices for their goods, while their successes in exports "preversely fuel protectionism."

He reiterated Manila's objection to "restrictive austerity measures" imposed by the IMF, which include limits on government spending, money supply and imports, and pressures to devalue the local currencies of debtor nations.

The Philippines, with a foreign debt of 25.2 billion dollars, is seeking a relaxation of the strict terms of a 10-million-dollar IMF standby facility. The release of each of the seven tranches of the facility are the signal for the private banks to release loans to the Philippines.

Mr Virata urged the Hispanic bloc to have the political will to solve the debt problem, which "threatens the national survival of countries."

He said developing nations recognize the need for "putting their own houses in order," but said this must be matched by "policy changes in the industrial world and action on the part of multilateral financial institutions."

CSO: 4200/29

PHILIPPINES

BRIEFS

GERMAN BANKERS OFFER AID--Two German bankers have offered to infuse P [Peso] 0.5 billion in fresh capital into the bankrupt Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). The two bankers--Werner Klaus Behrend and Hartmut Joost--met recently with General Sinforoso Duque of the Armed Forces of the Philippines at a luncheon held at the Army and Navy Club. The offer was made through the MacArthur Memorial Foundation, Inc. The foundation's board and finance committee will hold an emergency meeting on October 4 at 4 p.m. to discuss the mechanics of the capital infusion. The meeting will be held at Suite 208 San Martin Building, 1564 Mabini, Ermita, Manila. General Duque promised the two Germans that he will apprise President Marcos of their offer. He also vowed to take up with the President the plight of 800 PVB employees who were laid off following the bank's closure, and the complaints of 18,000 Filipino veterans who received low pensions and miniscule benefits. [Text] [Manila METRO MANILA TIMES in English 30 Sep 85 p 16]

GOLD TRADING IN DAVAO--President Marcos today directed the Central Bank to set up a gold-buying agency in Davao del Norte. The agency will regulate production and trading activities which are being cornered by Chinese buyers. More on this from Bert Asuge: [Begin recording] At the same time the president also directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines to help maintain peace and order and to protect the gold panners in the mining areas from lawless elements and terrorists. The chief executive issued the twin directive on the request of some 1,320 datu (tribal heads--FBIS) and chieftains headed by Rajah (Carlito Buntas) who went to Malacanang to pledge their loyalty to President Marcos and the First Lady and support for the economic recovery and anti-insurgency programs. Meanwhile, the president referred to the Bureau of Forest Development the request that Manobos [a Mindanao minority tribe--FBIS] be given permits to cut and sell timber from the [name indistinct] reservation in their ancestral lands. Under the law it is prohibited to cut timber from [words indistinct]. Rajah (Buntas), together with the other datu and chieftains, also expressed satisfaction over government efforts to promote small-scale mining operations. [Text] [Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 1000 GMT 2 Oct 85]

RICE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM SHIFTS--[Words indistinct] of palay procurement by the National Food Authority [NFA] will shift to Central Luzon. The procurement program is being boosted by 600 billion pesos [words indistinct]. Prime Minister Cesar Virata authorized the NFA to draw the money from [words

indistinct]. The NFA procurement activities are now concentrated in Iloilo. [words indistinct] procuring palay at the rate of (24) cavans per day. [Text] [Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 0400 GMT 3 Oct 85]

PROPOSAL ON TAX SYSTEM--A proposal on the country's taxation system is among the proposals to be submitted by Prime Minister Cesar Virata to the IMF-World Bank meeting in South Korea next week. President Marcos has instructed Virata to negotiate with the IMF. The president said the revenue code must be amended to make the tax system more responsive to the economic recovery program. The revised code would see to it that no additional tax would be paid by consumers of food products. There will be no taxes on agricultural products sold in raw form, or which are processed normally. As agreed upon in yesterday's KBL [Kilusang Bagong Lipunan] caucus, the revenue code would be amended so that the existing 24 categories of sales taxes could be reduced to about three. [Text] [Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 0400 GMT 4 Oct 85]

OPTIONAL BLOC VOTING--President Marcos yesterday [3 October--FBIS] was given a vote of confidence by the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan [KBL] to decide on whether or not to adopt optional bloc voting in the coming 1986 and 1987 elections. The vote of confidence was given the President on motion of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile after the KBL caucus failed to decide on the matter. Proponents of optional bloc voting pointed out the advantage of bloc voting, claiming it will help illiterates save time in both the voting and counting. Political Affairs Minister Leonardo Perez, however, pointed out that members of the opposition claim bloc voting can be an instrument of fraud because it would be very easy to convert a ballot into a straight ballot. [as heard] Defense Minister Enrile, however, explained that the KBL is strong and can win even without bloc voting. [Text] [Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 3 Oct 85]

CSO: 4200/29

THAILAND

CARTOON SEES U.S.-THAI RELATIONS AS MASTER-SLAVE

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 28 Jul 85 p 3

[Cartoon]



CSO: 4207/17

THAILAND

PUBLISHER BLASTS POLITICAL PARTIES' LEADERSHIP

Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 5 Sep 85 p 58

[Article by Ratana Yawaprapat: "The Fight Between Different Systems"]

Militaries are like leaves--while some start to fall, others start to turn yellow and the new dark green ones are getting ready to take their places. The military life cycle is worth watching, especially in a country where democracy is still not in a full-fledged state, due to the fact that the majority of people are farmers with no awareness of systematic mass fighting. Thus they become an easy prey for instigation and destruction.

As far as the military is concerned, if you look at its organization, you will see a well-structured and unified system. However, if you look closely, you will realize that actually it is made up of just ordinary people with the same greeds and other bad qualities as other people, no matter what occupations they are in. Thus, within their own circles, you can expect to see rivalry, slander and, most important of all, strenuous fights in order to put themselves in important positions either militarily or bureaucratically.

Fighting among themselves is actually a natural instinct in both human beings and animals, either fighting for power or to become leader. The military, with a strong organization and stable financial support from taxes collected, will thus fight intellectually rather than physically.

In looking at other groups, especially the rivals of the military in politics, that is, politicians and political parties, you will see that the organization of the Thai political party is still weak and fragile since party leaders still have to depend on financial resources from millionaires who support the party, not from taxes collected from the public as does the military. In fact, the financial resources of political parties in democratic countries come from the general public who support the parties and thus are willing to pay their dues as members of the parties. In Thailand, however, collecting membership fees from party

members seems to be an impossible task since there has never been any precedent in this area before. This is one of the weaknesses of Thai political parties which has resulted in the indifferent relationship between the public and the political parties. As a result, the public never thinks of the parties as their political representatives.

Another group of people, even though they have no direct political power yet who always have taxes as their financial resources, will cling to their positions as long as possible. When the military is in power, it will cling to the military. When the politicians are in power, it will cling to the politicians. This is the group of government officials who once in a while boldly announce that they will be missed if they are no longer in office. This is the group that is in charge of almost all the power of the state. Excluding the military and police, this group of government officials is a very important variable in the fighting between the military and politicians in Thailand.

It is worth noticing that if this kind of fighting is still going on, democracy--which is being dreamed of each day of our lives--will still be an impossible dream that will never come true. With the organized system of the military and a steady supply of financial resources, it is indisputable that the military will forever have the upper hand with respect to negotiations. Meanwhile the political parties will continue being unorganized and will also have to depend on millionaires and even on the military and government officials for survival. As a result, they will not have the strength to fight with anybody, let alone fight for their own survival.

Our suggested solution to the political party leaders now is for them to organize their parties by following the standard methods of universal democracy. In particular, they will have to rely more on the public instead of on the millionaires as it has always been. Political parties need to have a very good relationship with the public by collecting membership fees from them, and most important by letting them select their own representatives from the group and district up to the provincial levels to work for them in the parties, instead of letting those with large financial resources come in and demand that the parties do what they want--as has always been the case since the political party legislation was first put in effect.

However, collecting membership fees is an innovation and may not be immediately accepted in Thailand. (It is not unusual that the professional membership organizations in Thailand can collect less than half of the membership dues from its members, even from the newspaper-related organization itself.) It is therefore necessary that the party leaders as well as the representatives spend their 9-month recess explaining to the public their major resolutions for the party's survival and strength in order to be able to fight against an organized group like the military.

As long as political parties are still lax--with their leaders taking only their own interests and advantages into consideration--there will never be a party whose main interest is with the public and for the public. My opinion is that the public should be the one to put pressure on those politicians and party leaders to steer the country toward democracy.

12781

CSO: 4207/295

THAILAND

CONTINUING COVERAGE ON PHICHIT ROLE IN COUP

Col Prachak Comments on Key Players

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 11 Sep 85 pp 1, 16

[Excerpt] Col Prachak Asks to Talk With the Rebels

At 1100 hours on 10 September 1985, Col Prachak Sawangchit, a former officer who participated in the 1-3 April 1981 coup and who is close to Col Manun Rupkhachon, told a DAO SIAM reporter that he had not known about this coup beforehand. When he learned that Col Manun had staged a coup, he became worried and so he tried to contact several senior officers in the government. But when he called, no one would talk to him since they thought that Col Prachak was one of the coup makers.

Thus, he contacted the wife of Lt Gen Phichit Kunlawanit. He explained things to her and was then able to talk with Lt Gen Phichit. Col Prachak told him that since he is a friend of Col Manun, he wanted to help settle this matter. "Hank" and Col Prachak were asked to go talk with Col Manun at the Sua Pa Field. But things were very tense at that time and so "Hank" went by himself to see Col Manun and asked him to surrender in order to stop the bloodshed. He asked him to leave the country.

Phichit Gave Him \$2,000 Before He Left the Country

Col Prachak said that he and Col Manun are close friends. Col Manun is a very moral person. He loves his subordinates. When he found out about this coup attempt, he knew that Col Manun would be defeated and so he tried to contact Lt Gen Phichit in order to help resolve the situation. When Lt Gen Phichit found about this, he asked Col Manun to leave the country and gave him \$2,000 in cash, which he had been planning to send to his son who is studying abroad. Col Manun went to Singapore first. It can be said that Lt Gen Phichit played a very good role in solving this problem. He was very concerned about the nation and the monarchy. And thanks to the great prestige of the king and queen and other members of the royal family, the attempted coup ended without further bloodshed.

Three Retired Generals Were Forced to Participate

This coup was inspired by 14 October and was carried out with good intentions toward the nation. Another factor was psychological oppression. But when he realized that he was wrong, Col Manun had to leave the country even though he had previously announced that he would fight to the death. After people talked to him, he agreed to leave. As for the role played by Gen Soem Na Nakhon, a retired officer, Gen Kriangsak Chamanan, the former prime minister, and Gen Yot Thephatsadin Na Ayuthaya, a retired officer, they were all forced to participate in the coup since they are respected by many people. Col Manun forced them and so they had to participate.

Col Prachak also said that Gen Yot is a very patriotic man. He is an old soldier who was compelled to come forward and confront this problem. Even though he knew that this was against the law, he had to participate since he was forced to do so. In such a situation, he had to try to find a way to solve the problem. Gen Yot did not want power. During the 6 October coup, Gen Yot was one of the coup leaders. But he did not play a visible role. He urged Admiral Sangat Chaloyu to serve as the head of the Reform Council. Col Prachak also said that of all of Thailand's prime ministers, Gen Prem Tinsulanon is the most honest. But even though he is an honest person, he cannot solve the problems. The only problem that he has solved is the matter of dressing well.

The Economic Problems Should Be Admitted; We Shouldn't Fool Ourselves Any Longer

The attempts to solve the economic problems have been a great failure. Prem has managed to survive by compromising. But things have grown worse and worse. The people should be told the truth. The people shouldn't be deceived into thinking that all our economic problems stem from the world situation. This shows that this group of administrators does not have a sense of responsibility or the spirit of politicians. They are not willing to make a sacrifice and allow others to govern in their place. What happened should be an example for younger revolutionary officers. The idea of using force and of dividing into cliques should be a thing of the past.

Col Prachak also said that as a former soldier, he lives in a very narrow society since soldiers are trained only to be patriotic and disciplined. Thus, there is no political role for them to play. And so when soldiers stage a coup, they play according to the rules. If they are defeated, they are ready to accept death. Patriotism is not just a word. People must have the ability to solve the problems. If they can't, they should not be dogmatic. He said that he is sure that something like this will happen again.

Praise for Athit, a Person Who Has Shown Great Sportsmanship

As for this coup, Col Manun was too sure of himself. He was under great psychological pressure and so when he could no longer bear the pressure, he led former subordinates, who were cavalymen of the 4th Cavalry Battalion, in a coup. He thought that after he launched the coup, senior officers would support him. He made a mistake in judgment.

In conclusion, Col Prachak said that Gen Athit Kamlangek, the RTA CINC and supreme commander, is a man of spirit. While he will fight you to the death in the arena, once out of the arena, he is willing to be friends. Thus, he is a man who has a sense of sportsmanship.

More on Phichit-Manun Contacts

Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 26 Sep 85 pp 13, 14

[Excerpt] Lt Gen Phichit Kunlawanit, the commanding general of the 1st Army Area, is considered to be the person who put an end to the latest coup. That is, he is the one who negotiated with the rebels at their headquarters at the Sua Pa Field and got them to stop fighting. He agreed to let Col Manun Rupkhachon, one of the coup leaders, leave the country. Col Manun agreed to this and so an Air Force plane flew him to Singapore. It stopped in Hat Yai to refuel before flying to Singapore. Two cavalry NCOs who had commanded tanks went with him. Col Manun has been given a visa to go to Germany (the United States has refused to give him a visa as a political refugee).

A report from a person who was close to events said that when Lt Gen Phichit went to rebel headquarters at the Sua Pa Field at 1400 hours on 9 September, Col Manun rushed up and prostrated himself before Lt Gen Phichit and asked him to look after his family. He asked him to see to it that they are well cared for and do not experience difficulties after he is gone. This shows that Col Manun was intending to "fight to the death." After negotiating for about 30 minutes, Col Manun agreed to the proposal made by Lt Gen Phichit, that is, to leave the country, with the government providing an aircraft to take him to Singapore. Lt Gen Phichit gave him \$2,000.

The coup is over now, and the coup makers are facing the consequences of their actions. But as for Lt Gen Chawalit Yongohaiyut (who will become a full general this October) and Lt Gen Phichit Kunlawanit, we will have to watch their future paths carefully. LAK THAI has analyzed their paths several times prior to this coup. The events of 9 September will definitely cause certain things to change.

11943
CSO: 4207/11

THAILAND

BACKGROUND ON GENERAL'S APPOINTMENT TO ETO POST

Bangkok WIWAT in Thai 20-26 Aug 85 pp 21-23

[Article: Chulachomklao Class 5 To Control ETO; Samak Sundaravej's Second Mistaken Game"]

[Text] The 6 August 1985 cabinet meeting acknowledged a Ministry of Communication's report stating that Maj Gen Phuchong Ninkham will be the chairman of the Express Transport Organization (ETO) from 29 August in place of Maj Gen Sutsai Hatsadin, who will finish his term on 28 August because he has reached the retirement age of 65. This is based on a 1985 decree concerning the qualifications for the boards of directors and staffs of state enterprises.

Maj Gen Phuchong Ninkham

Major General Phuchong currently is the commander of an artillery division. He was born on 23 July 1933, and has a long time ahead of him in government service. He is not only a Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Class 5 member currently controlling a force of 11 divisions, but also holds a political position as a senator.

In addition to being a Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Class 5 member and a senator, Maj Gen Phuchong Ninkham is also a military officer whom General Prem likes and trusts because he concentrated on clearing up the 1982 assassination attempt on a prime minister named Gen Prem Tinsulanon. He was the one who actually brought the defendants to trial and to be punished, even though he was in an auto accident which he barely survived. And as a result of that assassination attempt in combination with "national security," Pol Maj Gen Boonchu Wangkanon of Class 5, who carried out closely with [Maj Gen Phuchong] the investigation of the assassination attempt on General Prem's life, unexpectedly stepped up to become commander of the Suppression Division in October 1983, which shocked every group.

In addition, Major General Phuchong played an important role supporting "General Prem's security" throughout the baht devaluation controversy of November 1984 as well as the arrests of two Young Turks two months before that.

Major General Phuchong's role for the most part has been to firmly and completely support General Prem, the same as Lt Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyut, "Big Chiew." But at the same time, he has reported directly to Gen Athit Kamlang-ek, the supreme commander, who is his immediate superior. Even though he has not been very close to General Athit, there has been no discernible split or crack between them, other than insinuations at the time about the arrests of two Young Turks.

Samak Suntharavej's Moves To Seek a [Power] Base

In 1984, Mr Samak Suntharavej, the Communications minister, proposed the nomination of Air Vice Marshal Kan Phimanthip, director of the Air Force Strategy Department, as a director of Thai International Airlines Company without informing Air Marshal Prapan Thupatani, Air Force commander-in-chief. Consequently, this approach suddenly failed when the Air Force did not approve Air Vice Marshal Kan to become a director of Thai International.

"We had to object because it did not follow proper channels; his basic unit should have been informed first; it was not right to inform the unit afterwards," an Air Force officer who is knowledgeable about this matter disclosed to ATHIT WIWAT. And he stated that Mr Samak had to submit the nominating papers to the Air Force commander-in-chief to follow proper right channels and replace Air Vice Marshal Kan with Air Marshal Udom Thanabut in the Thai International director's position.

Mr Samak's actions turned out to be the same pattern as before: he submitted his letter to the Cabinet directly without asking Phuchong's basic military unit. It has been commented that Mr Samak's aim [in doing this] stemmed from his perception that Maj Gen Phuchong Ninkham is an officer whom General Prem trusts and that he is the most prominent Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy officer.

"I think Mr Samak surely must depend on the military in seeking power like that; it is nothing more than that," the same Air Force officer commented concerning the Ministry of Communications of Mr Samak Suntharavej [as published]. Meanwhile, a Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Class 5 officer commented the same way. Maj Gen Phuchong Ninkham did not know anything at all about this matter; but suddenly, there were reports that the Cabinet had approved his nomination.

Athit Displeased; "Samak's" Wishes Collapse

Army intelligence reports revealed to ATHIT WIWAT that Gen Athit Kamlang-ek, Army commander-in-chief, was furious as soon as he learned about this matter. And his displeasure also fell on Major General Phuchong who had to go and explain that he did not know anything [about] this beforehand.

There are still no official announcements confirming that Maj Gen Phuchong Ninkham will reject the position of chairman of ETO. But from observing developments, it likely will turn out that way because Major General Phuchong himself must respect General Athit, who is his immediately superior. But at the same time, Major General Phuchong has been very busy since 1983 building up and developing his newly established and growing artillery division, which has

required a lot of improvement. And at the same time, concerning this year's officer promotions, Maj Gen Viroj Saengsanit, an artillery division commander and a classmate of Major General Phuchong, has the opportunity to be promoted the Army Logistics Division's assistant chief-of-staff, and Maj Gen Phuchong Ninkham has the opportunity to be transferred back to his old place as commander of an artillery division, [Major General Phuchong] will surely be busier.

These are only the initial developments in this matter that ATHIT WIWAT has investigated.

It is believed that Maj Gen Phuchong Ninkham's decision must have been advised by Lt Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyut or that General Prem once more played a part in the final decision about letting the military share in carrying a burdensome state enterprise, such as ETO, which is not in very good shape.

Concerning Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Class 5 again, it surely still is remembered that many persons from this class have been nominated by the Ministry of Interior to be committee members of the Bangkok Metropolitan Council. However, General Athit likewise did not agree with those nominations--which are not what the officers wanted, either--so they each decided to submit letters of resignation.

And if Major General Phuchong refuses the chairmanship of ETO this time, the final conclusion cannot be any other than that [this nomination] was a mistaken move [by Samak]. If Major General Phuchong accepts the post, it is not always certain that military power can save a state enterprise like the Ministry of Communication's ETO from a violent monsoon.

12587

CSO: 4207/277

THAILAND

CENTRAL BANK MOVE TO HELP RICE, CASSAVA EXPORTERS NOTED

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 27 Aug 85 pp 1, 16

[Excerpt] On 26 August, Mrs Praphaphim Sukuntaphai, the director of the Office of the Secretary, Bank of Thailand, issued a statement concerning measures to give financial help to rice and cassava exporters because of the present international trade recession. She said that Mr Kamchon Sathirakun, the governor of the Bank of Thailand, had held a meeting with export officials and officials from other units in order to find ways to help promote rice exports. Because at present, exports are facing serious competition on world markets. There is great competition, especially for markets in Africa, the Middle East and South America. Unless Thai rice exporters receive help, they will face very serious competition.

The Bank of Thailand will support rice sales by granting long-term credits to rice exporters who sign sales contracts with other countries. Instead of 6 months, credits will now be granted for a period of 1 to 3 years. However, this will be considered on a case by case basis based on suitability and necessity.

"Using this method, rice exporters who contact countries that do not have money can suggest that purchases be made using long-term credit. If we extend credit to them, we will get more of these markets. As for these rice markets, these are markets for low-quality rice. They need several hundred thousand tons each year," said Mrs Praphaphim.

Mrs Praphaphim also said that besides the measures for selling rice by extending long-term credit, the Bank of Thailand is promoting the export of rice by increasing the take over of discount promissory notes for rice that have been issued based on warehouse receipts by another 10 percent. That is, the rate will be increased from 50 percent to 60 percent of the value of the goods stated on the export rice warehouse receipts. This measure will be in effect from 28 August to 30 December 1985.

Mrs Praphaphim said that the Bank of Thailand has given the rice and cassava exporters additional time to pay their fines, which they incurred for failing to export the goods on time. The time limit has been extended from 60 days to 150 days. This is just a temporary measure and will be in effect only until 31 December.

Mrs Praphaphin also disclosed that during the period January-July 1985, rice exporters took long-term, low-interest credits valued at 7,050 million baht. Of this, 2,544.8 million baht was used for the storage of goods. It is expected that long-term, low-interest credits granted to rice exporters will reach 13,000-14,000 million baht by the end of the year.

11943

CSO: 4207/14

THAILAND

CORN MARKETING PRACTICES, QUALITY CONTROL PROBLEMS

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 8-14 Aug 85 pp 27-29

[Article: "CP Slits Its Own Flesh: Going Against the Corn Market's Turmoil"]

[Text] The CP Family--mentioning this godfather of the agribusiness seems to shake up business circles every time.

The same as this time. The CP Family and the Kaset Rungruang Group have woken up the corn business again after an alarming silence because the corn market has been falling continuously.

That is because the CP Family and the Kaset Rungruang Group or Sun Hua Seng have bid to sell 20,000 tons of corn to South Korea at flesh-gouging prices. The first lot is for \$107.75 CNF, with delivery scheduled for 6-20 June; Kaset Rungruang has scheduled the second lot for \$106.48 CNF, with the date of delivery between 16-30 June.

It is shocking for all [agribusiness] circles because the bid price was lower than the market price and after deducting shipping costs, the selling price will only be \$93 per ton or approximately 139 baht per hap [60 Kg]. Even if the price falls when the time for delivery arrives, it is speculated that it will not fall lower than \$140 per hap.

So the entire business has been shocked [by their low price bids], but it seems to perceive that these bids are inducements [based on] hopes for future orders that are expected to come in regularly.

The CP Family and the Kaset Rungruang Group came forward to bid at such low prices in spite of the fact that corn prices have been so low that nobody has dared to move. This event is considered to bode well for the Thai corn market's structure.

Repeated Drastic Price Drops in Domestic and International Markets

Major agricultural merchants are making sell bids like these because the corn market has been in a U shape, especially since the end of last January. The price of corn fell from 165 baht per hap to only 160 baht per hap and up until 30 January, when there was a sale of surplus stock at only 153 baht per hap.

All this resulted from additional overflows of corn into the market; in particular, corn from Pak Chong and Wang Nam Yen entered the market at a rate up from 5,000 to 6-7,000 tons per day while the Chicago market price also fell, worsening the corn price crisis. As an indirect result, the domestic corn trade suddenly came to an abrupt stop. There has been minimal trading, and there have not been that many other large orders to bid on.

In a situation where trading with immediate delivery still loses money, nobody has dared to take such risks. Those [middlemen] who had futures contracts [to sell] from June to July in large amounts made a profit, while those [middlemen] who had futures contracts to buy all lost.

Three Decades of Progress in Corn Production Without Development

The problems in the corn business are not different from those of other agricultural products and their self-damaging, cut-throat low price bidding. The major problem is that there has not been a definite policy when competing with foreign countries; usually, the price has been cut so low that corn exports sustain losses. There are problems of violating contracts with merchants, and more alarming is the corn aflatoxin problem.

Thailand actually has been growing corn for a long time and has increased its cultivated area to 12.69 million rai over 30 years when it was only 606,000 rai. However, the yield per rai has not increased and remains only 300-500 Kg per rai, which is very low compared to those in foreign countries.

Currently, a survey of corn production areas for 1985-1986 shows clearly that an area of 12.60 million rai will be cultivated with corn, with a production of 4.5 million tons, an average of 355 Kg per rai.

For 1984-1985, the area cultivated for corn was 11.828 million rai, with production of 4.2 million tons, a yield of 355 Kg per rai. The second survey of 1984-1985 showed that the cultivated area was 12.226 million rai, with a production of 4.6 million tons and yield of 376 Kg per rai.

Obviously, the efficiency of corn production has not developed at all; only the quantity has increased. The price for corn in 1984 did not fall and was quite reasonable. The price for corn at that time was better than those for other produce so people turned to growing corn and those who were already growing it, expanded their areas under cultivation. When weather conditions are favorable, even though there is only some rain at certain locations, it does not impact corn plants too much, so the price of corn at such times has still been higher than those for other produce.

The problem of aflatoxin on corn has been linked with low yields, which has been a troubling quality control problem that clients cannot accept.

We cannot deny that when Thai corn has not improved in quality and does not meet the standards demanded by the market, that exporting corn is not worthwhile and losses are repeatedly sustained because production and the Thai corn market cannot escape being tied in with international corn market conditions.

Thailand in Heavy Corn War: Merchants Gather To Fight

An important point is that the price of Thai corn depends mainly on the international market, especially the main corn market price in Chicago in the United States, which is the major producer of corn in the world with 43 percent of world corn production; China, which has an average production of 70 million tons per year, is next.

If we look at production trends around the world in 1985-1986, there will be around 456.4 million tons of corn, while in 1984-1985, there were 450 million tons and the United States had an approximately 75 percent share of the export market. However, in 1985-1986, the United States will export less, namely, down from 49.5 million tons to only 43.2 million tons. Due to the instability of the dollar, the United States lost the Korean market to China.

It is worth noting that many countries have tried more and more to turn to a policy of self-reliance, such as Argentina, which turned to growing corn for 3 continuous years when it experienced a bad wheat crop.

Along with this, many countries have begun to import less corn from Thailand, such as Saudi Arabia, which used to be a major client. Saudi Arabia seems to be importing less and on top of that, the Farki Company, which used to import corn from Thailand, has declared that it will import half of its usual volume and will buy corn when it is \$15 per ton less than United States prices.

The conditions for bargaining in international trade are quite sensitive because it is buyers' market. Thailand should concentrate on developing its products and make the market keener, but it always seems to have problems.

Taiwan's case surely should be an obvious example of [these] problems. [Corn trade] relations abruptly broke in 1982 because of problems between Thai exporters and Taiwanese importers [and remained broken] until 1984, when Taiwan came back and bought 50,000 tons of corn from Thailand. But we have experienced a problem with high aflatoxin levels of higher than 50 ppb. This has caused a lot of damage and it has not been settled until now.

Many countries import corn from Thailand: the USSR and Malaysia; Singapore and Hong Kong are beginning to import less from Thailand. Japan and Taiwan and even South Korea likewise have all turned to buying more from China because when they buy from Thailand, they are stuck with the problems of quality and a price that depends on the Chicago market.

Bamboo Curtain Unveiled: Beware of New Competitor

These days in agribusiness circles everyone is sending out warning signals to each other to watch China carefully, chorusing that it will be an extremely important adversary in the Thai corn war.

This is because since 1978 China has been instituting a new agricultural policy and hurriedly and widely developing agricultural quantities and quality. The obvious thing is that China used to import 1-2 million tons of corn per year. In 1984-1985, China instead exported 5 million tons aimed at penetrating the Japanese and Korean markets, which were formerly U.S. markets, and Hong Kong,

which was formerly a Thai market. China did this by increasing its corn production from 68.2 million tons in 1983 to 72.4 million tons in the 1984 crop year. This means that China has come in as a frightening competitor to Thailand and the United States, especially in Asian markets. On top of that, the quality of Chinese corn is better and the price is lower.

Nevertheless, even though China was going to sell to South Korea, there was a problem with shipping later than the scheduled dates, so China contacted Thailand to send corn to South Korea in its place. South Korea realized that going through [China] was a wasted expense, so that it changed to buying directly from Thailand. Thai exporters were lucky to get some of this part of the market back. As for how much they succeed, it depends on their own skills and abilities in competing.

Let us return to looking at the willingness of Sun Hua Seng and the CP Family to cut to the bone in their bidding to sell corn to Korea at very low prices. In part, they are speculating that it will be a beneficial market for exporters. But this also shows how vicious and difficult the competition is these days: when anyone gets a market, he must attempt by every means to protect, expand, develop and broaden it.

Two Remaining But Hidden Issues: When Is the Auspicious Time To Move?

Similar with other agricultural problems, the current turmoil and confusion and depressed prices for corn have occurred time and time again. For corn, there are two main problems that the government and exporters are well aware of: aflatoxin content and high prices, which make Thailand's corn unable to compete in the international market, especially in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, which are strict about quality.

Lately, even South Korea has issued regulations concerning the importing of raw materials for animal feed, which must be inspected at the point of destination for an aflatoxin content of less than 50 ppb. This regulation has been enforced since 1 August 1985. The recent sell bid of Sun Hua Seng must meet this regulation also.

Exporters are well aware of this problem, which is a persistent troubling pain. Mr Preecha Tanprasert, chairman of the Corn and Agricultural Commodities Merchants Society, has said concerning this matter:

"... The major problem with corn is its low quality. It has a high aflatoxin content because 80 percent of it is harvested from July through August, which is a period of heavy rain. The government must cooperate with the private sector in studying and laying out plans to control Thai corn quality starting with production by farmers up through the time that the produce reaches exporters. If we do not hurry to solve this problem, exports will experience graver problems."

High prices are another problem, because the investment is high and the yield is low. This is because the majority of farmers still use native varieties of corn. Meanwhile, the price of fertilizer is another factor that is contributing to the high price of corn, and which the government must try to control.

The government is well aware of these problems, including the ways to solve them. It is waiting only for the right time when it can seriously cooperate with the private sector and proceed to solve the problems meaningfully.

12587

CSO: 4207/277

THAILAND

MORE FARMERS FACE EXPROPRIATION OF LAND, LOAN-SHARKING

Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 26 Aug 85 pp 1, 16

[Article]

[Excerpt] Mr Chamlong Chanthain, a land reform official in Phichit Province, talked with reporters about the problem of allotting land to farmers. He said that in Muang, Bang Mun Nak, Thap Kho, Taphan Hin and Wat Sai Mun districts, financiers own more than 60 percent of the farm land. This is a very depressing matter. For many years now, the farmers have constantly had to borrow money and go into debt in order to grow rice.

Mr Chamlong said that some of the financiers are oppressing the farmers. After taking ownership of the land, they rent the land to the farmers at a rate of approximately 400 baht per rai per year. They charge interest of 40 percent a year and deduct 4 months interest in advance. Altogether, the farmers have to pay the financiers about 560 baht per rai per year. This is a very high rate of interest, and it exceeds the rate stipulated by the law on renting farm land.

The land reform official in Phichit Province said that because people are experiencing more problems, the government, through the Agricultural Land Reform Office, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, has established a land reform area in order to help provide land to farmers so that they do not have to pay exorbitant rents to financiers. During the year that this has been in effect, public and private-sector land has been purchased. The government is purchasing land from people who have not put the land to use or who own land in excess of the amount permitted by law. This land will be allotted to people.

Mr Chamlong said that the amount of land purchased has exceeded the target by 2,000 rai. That is, the first time, 1,700 rai were purchased; the second time, 2,400 rai were purchased. This land is allotted first to people who have no land to work and second to people who have very little land. After land is allotted, the Agricultural Land Reform Office monitors the activities of the people who have been given land. If the people in an area or district are diligent and act properly in growing crops and developing the locality, they will be given ownership rights to the land.

Reports about financiers using their financial power and influence to grab the land of farmers by loaning them money at rates exceeding those allowed by the law are common throughout the country. This is not happening just in Phichit Province. In all provinces, much of the agricultural land has fallen into the hands of financiers. Whenever prices for rice and upland field crops are low, more people suffer losses from having to pay exorbitant interest rates to financiers, who then grab the land. At present, more than 50 percent of the farmers who once owned their own land now have to rent land from financiers. They are exploited both by having to pay outrageous rates of interest and by being paid little for their produce. The government has never given them any real help. Even the establishment of the Land Reform Office has not been of much help since the government has given it a very small budget. Thus, it cannot help all the farmers who experience problems every year. And private financiers are not the only ones who are seizing land. Farmers are also losing their land to the commercial banks, including the Bank for Agriculture and Cooperatives. These banks regularly seize the land of poor farmers and sell it on the open market to wealthy people and their underlings.

11943

CSO: 4207/14

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

DEFECTORS TO KPNLF GO BACK TO PRK SIDE

BK050213 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 5 Oct 85 p 18

[Text] Aranyaprathet—The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) admitted yesterday 23 Heng Samrin troops who switched to its side last March had defected.

A KPNLF spokesman said 21 of the defectors were being detained for interrogation by Vietnamese troops at Ban Nimit.

Two others reportedly drowned in a river while on their way to surrender themselves to the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin Government in Phnom Penh.

The spokesman said after joining the KPNLF, all the 23 men were sent out to gather intelligence, but on 29 September they defected, taking a number of AK-47 rifles and RPG rockets along with them.

A Thai military report, meanwhile, said many parts in western Kampuchea, especially those adjacent to Thailand's Prachin Buri Province, had been flooded since the start of this month. In some areas, the water was said to be 1.50 meters deep.

The report said supplies of food and weapons to Vietnamese bases at the border proceeded with much difficulty because the strategic route No.56, built by the Vietnamese, was damaged, and some sections of the Highway No.5 were cut off by the floods.

Khmer resistance forces continued to attack Vietnamese positions, the report said.

Resistance fighters attacked a Vietnamese border base at Ban Dong Ngu, located opposite Aranyaprathet District of Prachin Buri, for two hours yesterday, it said.

CS0: 4200/55

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

VNA INTERVIEWS CHEA SIM ON PEOPLE'S ACHIEVEMENTS

BK081412 Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 8 Oct 85

[Text] Mr Chea Sim, Political Bureau member of the KPRP, chairman of the National Assembly of the PRK, and president of the KUFNCD, has granted an interview to a VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY correspondent in Phnom Penh. Asked about the achievements recorded by the Kampuchean people under the party's leadership, expressly since the fourth party congress, Chea Sim said:

In the past seven years of hard fighting and industrious labor, the Kampuchean people have recorded great victories in national construction and defense and unceasingly increased Kampuchea's prestige in the international arena. After liberation, economic reconstruction almost began from scratch. To quickly restore agricultural production peasants have managed to plant 2/3 of the prewar rice area and gradually organized themselves in 100,000 solidarity production groups. Animal husbandry and the planting of industrial and subsidiary food crops have made much progress.

As for industrial production, 36 out of the 60 old factories have been restored to meet part of the need of domestic consumers. The contingent of 150,000 workers and public employees throughout the country have formed a shock force. The party and state have initiated policies encouraging the development of small industry and handicrafts in the cities and towns and other traditional trades in rural areas. Commerce, capital construction, transport, communication, and banking have been restored or built to effectively serve production and other social activities.

Achievements in education, health care, and culture are also remarkable. So far, Kampuchea has about 1.8 million pupils of basic general education and 50,000 kindergarten children. On the average, one of every four persons is going to school. The whole country has more than 10 higher education and secondary technical institutions. Of the more than 1 million adult illiterate registered after liberation, about 70 percent can read and write now. The health network extending its services to communes is very active in popularizing sanitary notions, prophylaxes, and the treatment of common diseases.

However, reactionary forces are still sticking to their dark design. The Beijing expansionists colluding with the U.S. imperialists and instigating ultrarightist reactionaries in Thailand have done everything to help the Pol Pot clique strengthen their forces and oppose the Kampuchean revolution tooth and nail in an attempt to overthrow the revolutionary administration in Kampuchea and bring the Pol Pot clique back to power in Kampuchea. Nevertheless, thanks to the devoted and very effective assistance of the fraternal army and people of Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, the Kampuchean people and army have defeated one counterrevolutionary move after another.

The Kampuchean army and the Vietnamese volunteer army, imbued with proletarian internationalism, have closely coordinated in fighting for the revolutionary cause of Kampuchea, achieving many exploits, especially in 1984-85 dry season. They smashed a string of enemy bases along the Thai-Kampuchean border, dealing a bruising blow to the Pol Potist, Son Sannian, Sihanoukist forces. These victories mark a rapid growth of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Armed Forces and the contribution of the Kampuchean people to building an all-people national defense, preserving the revolutionary gains, strengthening and consolidating the people's republic regime, and steadily bringing the Kampuchean revolution forward.

These victories demonstrate the great vitality of the Kampuchean nation. They prove that the Kampuchean revolution, after standing the most difficult test of time and is advancing steadily, that the PRK is becoming stronger and stronger with the people closely appointed to the new regime, and that the Kampuchean situation is irreversible. [sentence as heard] Chairman Chea Sim continued: The Kampuchean people are deeply grateful to the Vietnamese party, army, and people for their wholehearted support and effective assistance to their revolutionary cause and are determined to protect and constantly consolidate the special militant solidarity and comprehensive cooperation between the two nations, regarding it a vital issue of the Kampuchean revolution.

In preparation for the upcoming fifth congress of the KPRP, Chairman Chea Sim said: At the 10th plenum of the party Central Committee held in February 1985, subcommittees have been set up to make amendments to the party statute and hold local party congresses. Various political activities are underway to welcome the fifth party congress, an important event in the Kampuchean people's political life.

CSO: 4200/55

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

KRATIE ACHIEVEMENTS IN COMBAT, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 28 Aug 85 p 3

[Article translated by Oudom: "Cambodian Mountain People Take Part in Constructing a New Life"]

[Text] Kratie is one of the provinces in the mountainous area approximately 200 km north of Phnom Penh Capital. It has had great success in various tasks in building a new life in Cambodia, e.g., taking part in protecting the revolutionary outcome which the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party struggled for and achieved with the assistance of SRV volunteer forces. With the assistance of the latter the military forces of these mountain people attacked the counterrevolutionary forces, drove 256 Khmer Rouge out of the locality, and also captured 107 enemies and 72 guns. Along with national defense work they mobilized 400 counterrevolutionaries to give themselves up to the revolutionary authorities' committee, along with 72 guns. They also determinedly carried out agricultural work on a total of 17,650 hectares where their basic aim was to grow rice and industrial crops in some parts. In past years they sold over 3,600 tons of rice to the government. In particular, (Sanou On and Sambo), which have become model districts of Kratie Province, have sold 1,000 to 2,000 tons of rice to the government. Generally speaking, these mountain people in the province have important duties and roles in taking part in construction and in raising the standard of living of the Cambodian people. The result of their work is 40 percent of the yearly plan for the province.

9884
CSO: 4206/180

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

SPK DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE

BK050743 Phnom Penh SPK in English 1056 GMT 4 Oct 85

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK 4 Oct--In implementing the tasks set forth at the Fourth Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea on economic restoration and development, the revolutionary authorities and peasants throughout the country over the past six years have centered their efforts on promoting agricultural production.

Despite unfavorable weather the peasants not only had enough food for themselves but also sold their surplus rice to the state. They also provided state-owned factories with industrial materials.

In 1982, when the fourth party congress's resolutions were made public, the peasants throughout the country, despite a long spell of drought, managed to put 1,680,000 ha under rice with a total output of 1,989,000 tonnes. Their surplus of 240,000 tonnes of rice were sold to the state with the slogan of "Sell surplus rice to the state means loving the nation," thus making a good contribution to the restoration of the national economy. The country's total planted area showed a remarkable increase of 630,000 ha over the 1981 figure or a two-fold increase over 1979.

In 1983-84, the rice hectarage also rose considerably. So far this year, the country has suffered from both drought and flood. But with great endeavors of the peasants, rice planting is expected on 1,700,000 ha for the current monsoon and 150,000 ha for dry season.

To boost agricultural production, the revolutionary administration of all levels has paid much attention to the establishment of solidarity production groups which is significant in gradually changing the mode of production in the countryside.

The solidarity production groups are being strengthened and developed with every passing day and become an important movement in pushing up production and building a new life. And many model villages and leading production groups have emerged from the movement.

The administration has encouraged the peasants to reclaim waste land. In 1982, 117,000 ha of land were put back into cultivation. Takeo Province, 80 km southwest of Phnom Penh, took the lead in this work, turning 8,000 ha of wasteland at Angkor Borei, Boreicholasa and Phnum Demrei Romiel Districts into rice fields. Moreover, the population of various provinces such as Svay Rieng, Pursat, Kompong Chhnang, Takeo have voluntarily moved to settle in new economic zones.

The intensive farming of the IR-36 and IR-42 rice varieties has been carried out across the country and yielded higher output. Last year, the intensive farming was done on 108,000 ha. The average output in some places in the Provinces of Kandal, Kompong Speu, Kompong Thom ranged between five and eight tonnes per hectare. Such an output had never been seen in previous regimes. By the end of the 1985 monsoon intensive farming will have been done on 131,000 ha.

To ensure better crops, the peasants, with assistance from the Ministry of Agriculture and the local authorities, have tried to repair and broaden the irrigation network. In the first semester of this year they built eight new reservoirs totaling 15,000 meters, dug 12 canals with 31,000 meters in length, repaired many dams, and dredged and strengthened a great number of old canals. Moreover, the state sent hundreds of motor pumps and millions of liters of fuel to the peasants and built for them a quantity of pumping stations.

Animal husbandry, an important part of Kampuchea's agriculture because it provides pulling force and meat, has also developed.

The Ministry of Agriculture and its network in provinces have established animal farms to improve hybridation. The state-owned pig farm at Srah Chak in Phnom Penh supplied the population with a great number of hybrid piglets. The herd of cattle increased from 1,323,500 in 1981 to 2,150,500 head in 1983. Meanwhile, the number of pigs rose from 210,600 to 1,880,500 and domestic fowl from 2,880,000 to 6,366,000.

Thanks to the great care of the new administration and the efforts of the population the production of rice and subsidiary food crops has quickly been restored, thereby greatly contributing to the successful fight against famine left by the genocidal clique of Pol Pot. In some localities like Samraong Tong District, Kompong Speu Province; and Phnum Penh District, Kandal Province, peasants got 750 and 720 kilograms of rice per capita respectively. In 1982-83 rice gathering, the peasants overfulfilled their plan of selling surplus rice to the state by 20 percent. The western border province of Battambang led the country in sales. Big changes have been seen in the northeastern provinces where peasants gradually gave up the old, backward tradition of rice planting.

The Provinces of Battambang, Kompong Chan, Prey Veng, Siem Reap Oddar Meanchey, Kompong Thom, Kompong Chhnang and Kratie also produced a large quantity of industrial and subsidiary food crops besides rice.

The restoration of fishery, forestry and the rubber plantation showed marked results. Rubber, the second important product after rice, was exploited on 24,700 ha in 1985 against 8,850 ha in 1981.

Kampuchea now can export an increasing quantity of marine and forest product including rubber.

CSO: 4200/55

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

BRIEFS

NEW INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER—Phnom Penh SPK 7 Oct—Hun Sen, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, has extended his congratulations to Bali Ram Bhagat, on his appointment as foreign minister of the Republic of India. Hun Sen says in his message: "I am strongly convinced that, under clear-sighted leadership of your excellency, the relations of friendship and cooperation between our two countries will be further strengthened and developed with every passing day." Hun Sen wishes his Indian counterpart good health, longevity, prosperity and more brilliant successes in this noble task. [Text] [Phnom Penh SPK in English 1112 GMT 7 Oct 85]

CSO: 4200/55

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BAC THAI PARTY UNIT STRENGTHENS MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Vu Ngoc Linh, a member of the Party Central Committee and Secretary of the Bac Thai Province Provincial Party Committee"]

[Text] Bac Thai has a very important strategic position. It is both the northern shield of Hanoi and the direct rear area of two border provinces, Cao Bang and Lang Son.

Our Bac Thai party organization has realized more and more profoundly the close relationship between the two strategic missions: In the present situation, in addition to attaining the economic norms we must endeavor to strengthen security and national defense. Those two strategic missions must be closely combined and be fulfilled by all sectors and echelons, under the unified leadership of the party committee echelons. Because of that understanding, in 1984 and the first months of 1985 our Bac Thai party organization adopted many specific policies to advance the local military work to a new level.

So that the echelons and sectors could have specific directions and measures, the Bac Thai party committee issued a resolution, after which the provincial and district party committees issued specialized resolutions on the local military work. On that basis the party committee echelons strengthened their leadership and organized the fulfillment of the local military work. At the provincial level we held training classes in military subjects for key leadership cadres of the sections, sectors, organs, enterprises, middle schools, colleges, districts, and municipalities in the province. In addition to improving the cadres' knowledge the Bac Thai provincial party committee also stepped up its supervision and control of the carrying out of the local military tasks, such as recruiting troops, training militia and self-defense forces, maintaining combat readiness, and preparing rear services forces to meet the needs of combat locally and aid the front.

We believe that the most important matter is that first of all the basic level party committees and governmental administrations, especially at the district and village levels, must truly be concerned with the local military work and both fulfill their leadership and guidance mission and organize the carrying out of the local military work. In order to do a good job of carrying out

training, mobilizing combat readiness forces, recruiting troops, etc., the basic-level party committees and governmental administrations must exercise direct leadership. For that reason, in recent years Bac Thai has concentrated its leadership on bringing about a basic transformation in the consciousness of the basic-level party committees and governmental administrations toward the local military work. The party committees and governmental administrations at the district and village levels are responsible for propagandizing and teaching the Party's viewpoint of building national defense by all the people, on the basis of which to create conditions for the people of the ethnic minority groups to bring into play their collective mastership right in carrying out the local military work. A very important matter is that we must increase the number of military cadres of the echelons and sectors from the district and village levels down to the organs and enterprises to ensure good political quality and good organization and command ability so that they can do staff work for the party committees and governmental administrations in the local military work. Therefore, during the past 2 years the corps of key military cadres of the districts, villages, organs, enterprises, etc., has been further supplemented and perfected.

Because of the requirement to ensure both economic development and a high degree of combat readiness, our party organization regards firmly grasping the reserve forces as an important mission. So that it will be possible to mobilize forces in sufficient numbers and of sufficient quality for combat within the required time, we continually pay attention to building up the ranks of cadres, preparing material bases, etc., for combat by the local forces.

In the process of organizing the implementation of the specialized resolutions on the local military work, the party committees have combined the missions of economic-social development in each area and sector with building national defense and security forces. When carrying out local economic-social development, such as deploying economic and population clusters, we have closely combined those tasks with the deployment of national defense and security forces. Therefore, in the process of building the districts and strengthening the district echelon economically and socially we have tied those missions in with building district military bastions so that every district and base can have sufficient economic and national defense potential and do the best possible job of meeting the combat requirements with regard to both manpower and materiel for the front.

Thanks to the tight leadership and guidance of the party committee echelons, the local military work in Bac Thai in 1984 and the first part of 1985 underwent new transformations. The troop recruitment mission was overfulfilled and fairness was ensured in implementing the Military Obligation Law. Many districts, such as Vo Nai and Dai Tu, advanced from "average" to "good." Combat readiness training for the armed forces, from militia and self-defense to the regular local troops, underwent transformations. Nearly all of the units were trained according to plan. The party committee echelons regarded leadership and guidance of combat readiness training by militia and self-defense forces as one of their responsibilities. The armed forces at all levels were placed under the direct leadership of that level. The local military work was also gradually decentralized with regard to command,

training, and the organization of rear services. Therefore, when there was a training or combat reinforcement the forces were able to mobilize the strength of the entire population. With the help of the villages and cooperatives, the personal needs of people going to take training were taken care of. During the reserve mobilization campaigns, at times thousands of troops were mobilized but the districts and villages took care of local rear-services needs. Due to the decentralization of the local military work, nearly all of the villages, districts, and municipalities in the province have food reserves for local military activities. Many districts and villages have mobilized the people to contribute foodstuffs to the local national defense fund and have created a solid basis for on-the-spot people's rear services and provided national defense funds in each village and district, such as Dai Tu, Phu Luong, Phu Binh, and Bach Thong for the maintenance of readiness to aid the front.

Every year Bac Thai has guided military training for the militia and self-defense forces with two mandatory requirements: good training quality and effective participation in economic development. For that reason, in 1984 and the first part of 1985 nearly all districts knew how to combine military training with the construction of roads, water conservancy projects, schools, public health stations, etc. During the first months of 1985 the military command committees of Bach Thong and Pho Yen districts mobilized thousands of militia and self-defense unit members to both train and participate in building the Nam Cat hydroelectricity project and completing the class-2 and class-3 canal and drainage ditch systems at Nui Coc Lake. In combining the economy with national defense Bac Thai has also coordinated with the army units stationed in the localities in order to fully utilize the capacities of machinery, equipment, and labor forces in building the important economic installations in the province with real effectiveness.

In building military forces, in order to rapidly master science, technology, and modern weapons and equipment we used the cadres and students in local colleges and middle schools by having them participate in building local military forces.

In addition to building combat readiness forces in the province we have continually been concerned with encouraging troops from the ethnic minority groups in Bac Thai who are standing firm at forward outposts along the border by doing a good job of carrying out the army's rear area work. The families of troops on active duty have received more attention materially and with regard to morale, which has effectively supported troop recruitment, the mobilization of reserve troops, etc.

On the basis of the results of the past 2 years we realize that in order to meet the requirement of both concentrating on economic construction and maintaining combat readiness and readiness to bring into play the combined strength of people's war to defend the homeland all levels from the provincial committee level down to the basic level must understand the two strategic missions fully and deeply. Those two strategic missions must be concretized in the economic-national defense plans. It will be impossible to fulfill the two strategic missions if the economic plans of each village and district do not encompass the national defense plans. On the other hand, the mission of

defending the homeland will encounter difficulties if it is not tied in with economic-social development plans. Therefore, the party committees must exercise direct, all-round leadership and guidance of the local military work on the basis of economic-social decentralization. Urgent requirements for Bac Thai are to rapidly increase the number of military leadership cadres at the basic level and closely combining military forces with security forces in order to gradually enable all villages and districts that are strong militarily, politically, and with regard to rear services. Each village is a bastion that is sufficiently strong to wage people's war, and must be both a force to support security and national defense and a strong source of support for economic development. In the immediate future they must effectively oppose the enemy's many-sided war of destruction.

As a province with an important strategic position, it must steadily step up its economic development and its building up of national defense forces. In 1985 and in future years our Bac Thai party organization will further strengthen its leadership of the local military work, resolutely overcome the deficiencies, and weaknesses, further develop the results that have been attained, and build military forces from the provincial level down to the basic level that are complete with regard to quantity and quality, have sufficient forces and on-the-spot rear services, and are determined to develop Bac Thai so that it can be worthy of being a shield of the capital and the direct rear area of Cao Bang and Lang Son.

5616

CSO: 4209/645

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

LE DUAN'S 'LETTERS TO THE SOUTH' REVIEWED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Apr 85 pp 30-46

[Introduction to the work "Letters to the South" by comrade Le Duan. Lead article is by the editorial board of TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN]

[Text] "Letters to the South" is a collection of letters and telegrams from comrade Le Duan, Secretary General of the Party Central Committee, to the leadership comrades on the southern battlefield during the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, from the Tri-Thien front to the central Trung Bo, southernmost Trung Bo, and Nam Bo theaters. The most important among them are the letters and telegrams sent to the comrades in charge of the Nam Bo theater. It includes the concluding speech by comrade Le Duan at the Political bureau conference held at the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975, on the revolutionary situation and missions in the South. It was a conference which soon led to the General Offensive and Uprising of the Spring of 1975, then a number of telegrams sent to the comrades principally responsible for the General Offensive and Uprising in the course of the fighting, from the beginning of the offensive to the complete victory which concluded the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation.

This is the first time that the letters and telegrams of comrade Le Duan have been published in the form of a book, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the complete liberation of the South and the complete victory of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation (30 April 1975-1985).

In the course of the anti-U.S. resistance war we knew about "secret documents of the U.S. Department of Defense," which revealed some of the secrets of the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam and the way the White House and the Pentagon guided that war. "Letters to the South" are also "secret documents" of Vietnam, "revealed" 10 years after the end of the Vietnam war, which help the reader realize additional factors which led to the great victory of our nation in its historic conflict with the U.S. imperialists and help answer the question, "How could Vietnam defeat the United States?" That "legendary" victory of Vietnam is correctly regarded as a major event of the century, the positive affect on the course of development of the world revolution will be increasingly confirmed by time. "And perhaps 10 years or 20 years later, Vietnam's defeat of the United States will still profoundly affect the course

of advance of many nations," as the author of "Letters to the South" wrote while the fighting between us and the enemy was still taking place fiercely.

"Letters to the South" were sent during all periods of our nation's sacred resistance war, from "opposition to the special war," through opposition to the "limited war" and the "de-Americanization and Vietnamization of the war," to the great victory of the General Offensive and Uprising of the Spring of 1975. "Letters to the South" shows us in a clear, concrete, and lively manner the development and perfection of the strategic line and the revolutionary and revolutionary war methods in the South in the Party's line of resistance war against the United States for national salvation, along with the skilled, sharp, bold, and accurate strategic guidance of the Political Bureau of the Party Central committee, led by our beloved President Ho Chi Minh.

We all know that comrade Le Duan was the person with primary responsibility to the Political Bureau and the Party Central Committee with regard to the revolutionary movement in the South, and "was responsible for making recommendations in that regard." He drafted the "Revolutionary Program for the South" in 1956, after the victory of the anti-French resistance war and the complete liberation of the South, while the south was still under the neocolonial ruling yoke of the U.S.-imperialists. The "Revolutionary Program for the South" became the basis for the Resolution of the 15th Plenum of the Party Central committee (Second Term) in 1959 on the path of advance of the revolution in the South. That resolution was an organic part of our Party's revolutionary line and line of opposing the United States for national salvation, which were approved by the Third Party Congress in 1960.

In the course of the resistance war comrade Le Duan, along with the other comrades in the Political Bureau, contributed greatly to gradually developing, concretizing, and perfecting the line on the revolution and revolutionary war in the South specifically and the line of the Vietnamese revolution generally, as well as to organizing the creative implementation of that line, which was manifested in part in the letters and telegrams making up this unique book.

In a general way, "Letters to the South" present an objective, scientific analysis, in a spirit of revolutionary offensive, of the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy in the war as a whole as well as the specific situation of the struggle between the two sides in each period and in each theater. On that basis, the book concretizes the strategic line and the revolutionary and revolutionary war methods of the South and creatively sets forth the correct policies regarding the various aspects of the struggle, which were appropriate to the specific situation, in order to defeat the enemy step by step, develop our forces, create turning points in order to transform the situation on the battlefield, then take advantage of the opportunity to strike a decisive blow, completely defeat the enemy, and win a complete victory.

The most outstanding features of the book "Letters to the South" are that it assesses the plots and forces of the U.S. imperialists and fully comprehends the strengths and, especially, the weaknesses, of the leading imperialist nation in the Vietnam war, even in the southern theater. That is also a major lesson for us in assessing our new enemy at present: the Chinese

expansionists and hegemonists. Le Duan points out that the developmental process of revolutionary struggle all over the world during the past several decades led to the historic conflict between the Vietnamese people and the U.S. imperialists, while at the same time presenting the strengths and weaknesses of the United States in that historic clash.

He recalls the time when respect and fear of the United States was widespread in many countries, when there arose wavering and doubt after the United States sent aggressor troops to the South and used its air force to attack the North and differing opinions were contributed to our Party regarding the revolution in the South, the socialist revolution in the North, the relationship between the revolutions in the two regions, etc. Therefore, we can see even more clearly independent, autonomous, correct, and creative revolutionary line of our Party, the iron-like determination of our people to resist the united States for national salvation, and the incisive, unique analysis of the U.S. imperialists by the Party and the Secretary General. "We must correctly evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the United States to avoid making the mistake of being subjective or underestimating the enemy, while at the same time being fully resolved and having effective fighting methods in order to win ultimate victory." Comrade Le Duan did not underestimate the plots and strength of the United States. How could he have underestimated the leading imperialist nation which had the greatest economic and military potential in the socialist bloc? Comrade Le Duan correctly analyzed the position of the South and the "determination" of the United States to remain in the South, in their aggressive plot toward all three Indochinese countries. He was of the opinion that if it took us 9 years to fight and defeat the French, twice as much time would be needed to defeat the United States. Remaining behind in the south to guide the revolutionary movement, he said goodbye to the comrades going to regroup in the North after the signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1954 with the promise, "We'll meet again in 15 to 20 years!" Was it not surprising that his promise would become a prediction and would be borne out?

But the problem that was to fully realize the U.S. weaknesses and correctly predict the limits of the U.S. aggressor war effort in Vietnam. On the basis of the evident truths about the United States which everyone knows, he stated definitively that "Since World War II no imperialist nation has suffered as many defeats as the United States," "at present, the United States is weak both politically and militarily in Vietnam," and "here, the United States is not strong militarily." On that basis, he affirmed the inevitable defeat of the United States and Indochina, an all-round defeat not only politically but also militarily. When the U.S. war efforts rose to their highest level, i.e. when they reached their maximum but they still could not win, they were forced to deescalate and accept defeat. It was not, of course, easy for a nation such as Vietnam, which did not have a large area or population, to cope with the leading imperialist nation and reach that conclusion.

The decision of our Party and state to fight and defeat the U.S. imperialists was a major decision of the epoch. That decision was based not only on subjective will but also had an objective basis; it was not simply a matter of sentiment and will but also a matter of intelligence and science. President Ho Chi Minh expressed his broad sentiment toward the South with a succinct remark, "The South is in my heart." He also conceptualized the iron-like,

scientific determination of our Party and people, in the form of the great truth, "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom!"

The great truth of Uncle Ho deeply penetrated the broadmasses and became material strength, and the prediction of the Party and comrade Le Duan became reality.

Our beloved Uncle Ho bid adieu to us before the great victory. In "Letters to the South, comrade Le Duan wrote to the comrades when they were preparing the General Offensive and Uprising of Tet Mau Than, "Uncle Ho wanted to go South personally to motivate the soldiers and people, but the Political Bureau recommended that he not go so that he could preserve his health. I ardently hope that you, along with the soldiers and people of the south, will devote all of your spirit and strength to that strategic battle and win the greatest possible victory so that Uncle Ho can soon visit the South." The general offensive and simultaneous uprising of Tet 1968 bankrupted the "limited war" strategy of the United States. But still obstinate and not yet willing to accept defeat, the United States changed over to "de-Americanizing and Vietnamizing the war." That year Uncle Ho was unable to go south to visit his compatriots and comrades. But his banner was still leading us on. Seven years later, with the great victory of the spring of 1975, the people of the south and the entire nation felt "the presence of Uncle Ho in the happy days of great victory."

The author of "Letters to the South" brought forth a dialectical, revolutionary, and scientific viewpoint on evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and of ourselves. "To speak of strength and weakness is to speak of a specific comparison of forces at a certain time and in a certain space. It is not merely a simple, mechanical mathematical exercise." "the success or failure of a revolution is in the final analysis determined by the comparison of forces. In war, the strong will win and the weak will lose. But to speak of strengths and weaknesses is to speak in terms of revolutionary viewpoints and developing viewpoints, which are the bases for combined evaluation which takes into consideration military and political aspects, position, forces, and opportunity, and both objective conditions and leadership art, and to view those factors in the course of their operation, within a certain space and time. It is insufficient to compare and evaluate strengths and weaknesses only on the basis of troop strength, units, outposts, and the number of weapons, equipment, and war facilities."

Our Party saw the strengths, and especially the weaknesses, of the United States in the over-all long-range fight between ourselves and the enemy, but also in each "escalation" of the war by the United States. When the United States sent 250,000, and then 500,000, U.S. expeditionary troops to the South, attacked the North, and waged a "limited war" after the defeat of its "special war" in 1965, and when the United States sent troops to invade Cambodia in 1970, signed the Paris Accords and withdrew the U.S. troops from the South in 1973, etc., our Party adopted correct strategic policies and did not fall back and take the offensive in such situation, but adopted the policy of carrying out an offensive strategy and resolutely attacked to defeat the U.S. war escalations. The analysis by the author of "Letters to the South of those strategic situations provide as a model of the application of dialectical

materialism in actual guidance, and at the same time manifests the strong spirit of revolutionary offensive of our Party and people on objective, very scientific bases. It is necessary to analyze the specific situation. Strength and weakness are not merely matters of numbers, passive factors that are entirely objective, but are matters of quality, active factors which reflects the synthesis of many factors which operate under the subjective influence of man and of the struggle between the two sides. With the same comparison of forces, if there is good subjective guidance few will be transformed into many and weakness will be transformed into strength, which will results in victory. If not, the reverse will be true and the result will be defeat. For example, with regard to the battlefield situation in 1973-1974, "Letters to the South" states, "In Military Region 9 the ratio between the enemy and ourselves was 1 to 8; but because we firmly grasped our strengths and the weaknesses of the enemy, we knew how to gain the strategic initiative and still won victory. On the other hand, in Tri-Thien the ratio between ourselves and the enemy was 1 to 2, but because they overestimated the strength of the enemy and did not realize our strength, the local comrades tended toward the defensive and held back, which caused us to be passive, lose the initiative, and allow the enemy to make gains and carry out pacification, and divide our lines and areas."

When analyzing the situation, the most important matter is to know how to evaluate events, reach the necessary conclusions, foresee the developmental tendency of the situation, and discover new developments as soon as they appear, while they are still in the incipient state, on the basis of which to have bold but correct subjective guidance to cause events to develop in accordance with subjective desires.

The evaluation by the author of "Letters to the South" of the victory of the Lao revolution after the Nam Tha victory in 1962 may be regarded as a model. "The lesson of the Lao revolution has a great importance with regard to the revolution in the South. That lesson allows us to realize more clearly the plots and capabilities of the U.S. imperialists in the present complicated international situation, and realize more clearly the upward tendency of the revolutionary movement in specific areas of the world." That was also the "result of correct revolutionary lines and methods," such as "with regard to struggle goals, the line was struggling for a peaceful, independent, and neutral Laos and the formation of a provisional governmental"; "with regard to revolutionary methods, there was both military struggle and political struggle, and both fighting and negotiating; the revolutionary army attacked Nam Tha directly, as if splitting bamboo, but knew to stop and not continue its advance, and not even take small enemy outposts, etc. The U.S. imperialists had to be defeated but could accept a limited defeat; we had to win victory but could accept a limited victory." Then the author analyzed in depth the specific situation of the revolution in the South and clarified the similarities and differences between the Lao revolution and the revolution in the South in order to reach correct conclusions about the revolution in the South of our country.

Due to the correct evaluation of events, comrade Le Duan conceptualized the process of defeat of the United States in the course of the "special war" by means of a succinct expression: "After the battle of Ap Bac, the Americans

realized that they could not defeat us and by the battle of Binh Gia they realized they would be defeated by us in their "special war." From the Van Tuong battle he concluded that we could defeat the United States in the "limited war." He observed correctly that at the beginning of 1968 "the americans were in a delima strategically" and "the U.S. war efforts in Vietnam have reached their highest point."

Comrade Le Duan usually foresaw things many other people did not foresee. After 1970, when the Americans crossed over into Cambodia and expanded the war to all of Indochina, and transformed Indochina into a single battlefield, he foresaw the possibility of winning victory at about the same time in all three countries--Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Although in Vietnam the South was the main battlefield, "in a certain situation the Cambodian revolution is capable of winning victory first." He believed that a once-in-a-thousand-years opportunity had arisen to liberate the South. The Americans had been defeated, had to withdraw, and could hardly return, while the other aggressor powers, such as China and Japan wanted to "fill in the vacuum" but were not yet ready to do so. "Outside of this opportunity, there will be no other. If we do not act, in 10 or 15 more years the situation will be no other. If we do not act, in 10 or 15 more years the situation will be extremely complicated." The plan to liberate the South in 2 years--drafted in 1974--was shortened to 1 year, 6 months, and then 2 months. That appeared to be subjective and adventuristic, but in fact because we realized the new phenomena and developments and the new capabilities that appeared on the battlefield, and realized the battles which signified those capabilities, such as Phuong Long, Buon Ma Thuot, etc.

Another point he made in assessing the situation, which always has current significance in our people's revolutionary struggle, was the important conclusion he made in a letter sent to COSVN in July 1970: "It is at times when the enemy think that they can reverse the situation and move closer to victory that they must heavy, unexpected defeats. On the other hand, the times when we are encountering myriad difficulties and are facing a dangerous situation, thanks to the correct strategic guidance of our Party and to the extraordinary efforts of our soldiers and people, the Vietnamese revolution overcame all challenges and take great leaps forward."

"Letters to the South" clarifies the common line of the Vietnamese revolution in the period of resistance against the United States for national salvation, on the basis of which the line toward revolution and revolutionary war in the South was correctly resolved.

The Third Party Congress (1960) set forth an independent, autonomous, correct, and creative revolutionary line in period of anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation: the simultaneous carrying out of two revolutions (the socialist revolution in the north and the people's democratic national revolution in the South) which shared the common goal of completing the people's democratic national revolution throughout the nation and advance to unifying the nation. The Party pointed out the role of each revolution in each region and the close combination of those two revolutions to complete the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation. The Party also pointed out the

basic problems of the people's democratic national revolution, from its goals and forces to its path of advance to victory.

Comrade Le Duan made the following analysis: "From a certain point of view, the situation in our country at present (when opposing the United States) is a microcosm of the general world situation." The revolutionary mission of the world is to maintain peace, prevent the imperialists from starting a war, and ensure security for the construction of socialism by the world socialist community. At the same time, it is necessary to gradually repulse imperialism and overthrow it bit by bit, and continue to advance the world revolutionary movement. Those two aspects of study are closely interrelated. The art of revolutionary leadership that has been posed is to correctly resolve the relationship between those two aspects in a manner appropriate to the specific situation regarding the comparison of forces between revolution and counterrevolution in each region and with regard to each nation and people. Therefore, the revolutionary mission of Vietnam is to maintain peace in order to build socialism in the north, while at the same time promoting the struggle to liberate the South. "If we do not overthrow the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists we cannot solidly defend peace in the North. On the other hand, if we cannot defend peace and begin to build socialism in the north, the revolution will encounter many difficulties and complications in both regions." To only stress protecting peace and building socialism in the North, and thus dare not promote the struggle to liberate the South would be to commit the mistake of rightist opportunism. On the other hand, to only stress the struggle to liberate the South and not pay attention to protecting peace and the great undertaking of building socialism in the North, and not knowing how to determine appropriate goals, methods, and paths of advance for the revolution in the South would be to commit the mistake of "leftist" opportunism. "If in leading the revolution in the South we do not clearly and correctly realize the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy and push the movement beyond the necessary level in the present situation, there will be bad consequences which will prevent us from meeting the revolutionary goals and requirements set forth for each region and for the nation as a whole. The leadership art, as well as the difficulties and complications of the revolution in the South, lie in having to correctly measure the extent."

The revolutionary goals set by the Party for revolution and revolutionary war in the South were to overthrow the lackey regime, defeat the neocolonial aggressive war waged by the U.S. imperialists, liberate the South, defend the north, and unify the nation. On the basis of the comparison of forces in Southeast Asia and in the world, comrade Le Duan pointed out that "We have set forth the requirements of repulsing the U.S. imperialists and defeating their aggressive, enslaving policy by overthrowing the lackey regime and setting up an independent, neutral regime in the South." "That is a good, appropriate, and correct tactic." Going all-out to limit the enemy to, and defeat them in, the South, and not allow the war to spread to the North was also a direction of struggle according to the strategic line and strategy that had been adopted.

With regard to the path of advance of the revolution in the South, from the beginning comrade Le Duan stressed that "The revolution in the South is not carried out by means of protracted armed struggle, by using the rural areas to

surround the cities and advancing to the use of armed forces to liberate the entire nation, as was done in China, but will follow Vietnam's path, i.e. limited uprisings, the setting up of base areas, the waging of guerrilla warfare, then advancing to a general uprising, carried out principally by political forces in coordination with armed forces to win political power for the people."

It must be pointed out that when calculating the capability of the revolution in the south to win victory by means of a general uprising--a capability that was considered for a long time after that--comrade Le Duan always pointed out that one could not take the dogmatic view of comparing the uprising in the South with the August Revolution, but had to use the core of the August Revolution in achieving new development for the revolutionary war in the South." He continually stressed the necessity of "more firmly grasping the development of armed forces," "building base areas," "building up our actual strength," and "firmly grasping the method of political struggle combined with military struggle." He believed that "It is essential that the general uprising be accompanied by a general offensive," and "The military offensive must be carried out a step in advance." The experience of world revolutionary struggle had indicated that "an uprising cannot succeed if the enemy is not defeated militarily and still uses instruments of violence to oppose the revolution."

On the basis of the situation of the revolution in the South taking place under the conditions of two world wars (the first and second) having led to the defeat of imperialist arms by the Russian October Revolution and the August Revolution in Vietnam, comrade Le Duan instructed that "In the case of the South, in order to advance to a general uprising it is necessary to defeat the enemy army, but here the enemy army will be defeated primarily by means of our revolutionary armed forces." Furthermore, he intended to criticize "comrades who think that if there is an uprising capability the revolution will automatically succeed." Was it that from the very beginning he took into consideration the possibility of the armed uprising developing into a revolutionary war and required the strengthening of armed forces and the building up of actual revolutionary strength to continue to advance the revolution?

Comrade Le Duan concretized the revolutionary methods in the south, the major features of which were correctly delineated at the very beginning and which developed gradually in the actual situation, from incomplete to complete, and conceptualized them in a succinct formula consisting of four phases: "Partial uprisings, the combination of military and political factors, the three strategic areas, and the general offensive-general uprising" (Speech to the editorial board of TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, March 1967).

In the developmental process of the revolution in the South, from armed uprising to revolutionary war and liberation war, the U.S. puppet regime used nearly 500,000 puppet troops to fight a "special war," after which the U.S. imperialists used 500,000 U.S. expeditionary troops and 500,000 puppet troops to wage a "limited war." Then came "de-Americanization and Vietnamization." Armed struggle gradually became the basic and decisive form of struggle. However, political struggle was also a basic form of struggle. Armed struggle

and political struggle continually affected each other and the combining of those two aspects of struggle became a law for winning victory in the revolutionary war in the South.

The entire book "Letters to the South" shows that in his actual guidance of the battlefields comrade Le Duan, from his analyses of the situation to the adoption of policies and measures, developed in an extremely rich manner the theory of both political struggle and armed struggle and of the combination of those two forms of struggle, as well as the building of real revolutionary strength on each battlefield and in the different periods, in order to win final victory for the revolution in the South.

With regard to political struggle and uprising, he resolutely stressed the role of that basic struggle form in all periods of the revolution and revolutionary war in the south, and criticized incorrect thoughts which deemphasized political struggle. He brought up many problems regarding the slogans of political and economic struggle, the illegal, semi-legal, and legal forms of struggle, and on secret, semi-open, "transformed" and open organizations.

Here we see clearly that comrade Le Duan recapitulated in a succinct and lively manner many rich experiences of our party and people with regard to political struggle in general in the different periods so that they could be applied to the southern revolution: the Nghe-Tinh Soviet (1930-1931), the secret struggle (1932-1935), the open struggle (1936-1939), the period of partial uprisings leading to General Uprising (1939-1945), and even the anti-French resistance war period (1945-1954).

Uprising is a special form of political struggle. Applying and developing the viewpoints on armed uprising of Marx and Lenin in the circumstances and conditions of revolutionary war in the South, because the characteristics of uprising in the South were not identical to those of the advance from partial uprisings to a General uprising to achieve complete victory in the August Revolution, comrade Le Duan contributed many important opinions on the rural areas, partial uprisings, and general uprisings, especially new viewpoints regarding uprising in war and the combination of uprising with war. According to comrade Le Duan, in the process of revolution in the South, the uprisings of the masses in the different periods were intended to fulfill different requirements. The uprisings in a number of rural areas at the end of 1959 and the first part of 1960 were intended to smash the U.S.-puppet control apparatus and win mastership for the people, especially at the basic level. That was the first step. The high tide of uprising in 1964, after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, was intended to regain most of the countryside, expand the guerrilla war, and enable the theaters, especially Military Region 5 and Nam Bo, to develop uniformly. The uprising movement of the masses in the cities and towns during Tet of 1968 was coordinated with the military attacks and created the opportunity to raise the banner of a new Front to force the Americans to accept, and open the way for them to accept, "defeat at an acceptable level." The mass uprisings of the Spring of 1975 were intended to support the military attacks and create overwhelming pressure to rapidly disintegrate the puppet army and regime in the final strategic, war-deciding battles. A letter sent to the Saigon-Gia Dinh Zone Party Committee was one

of the meaningful documents with strong actual guidance effect which was strongly critical and had profound theoretical value regarding the political struggle and urban uprisings. Comrade Le Duan set forth important viewpoints: "Even if our uprisings in the cities encounter difficulties" and "after entering the cities we have to withdraw from them," "we should not despair, for the rural and jungles-and-mountains areas belong to us and our position and force are strong there." The actual situation proved the correctness of those viewpoints.

With regard to armed struggle and revolutionary war, he continually affirmed "the increasingly decisive role of military struggle." He dealt with many problems regarding military art and the guerrilla warfare movement, fighting by the main-force units, and the combining of those two war-waging modes. "We must use very strong military blows and develop the guerrilla war in the enemy's rear area in order to defeat the U.S.-puppet military forces." Many rich people's war combat forms and fighting methods appeared on the battlefields: concentrated fighting, guerrilla fighting, the launching of combined campaigns, the setting up of "American-killing belts," sapper attacks, attacks on airfields, ports, and supply depots, attacks on roads, attacks on cities, etc. He paid much attention to large battles and coordinated combat arms campaigns, and also to small but very lethal and painful battles, to "knockout" blows against command organs, the nerve centers of the enemy military apparatus, and to the living quarters of officers and pilots. He stressed the necessity of finding the weaknesses of the enemy in order to fight them, but also of knowing how to fight the enemy's strengths and prevent them from bringing into play the superiority of an army which relies primarily on weapons and technical facilities.

An important matter is that he continually stressed the necessity of closely combining military struggle with political struggle, combining war with uprising, and combining military offensive with mass uprisings, in order to create combined strength with which to win and maintain the people's mastership right and annihilate large numbers of U.S.-puppet main-force troops, while at the same time corrupting their "strategic hamlet policy" and "pacification program." "The law of revolutionary war in our country and in all of Indochina is carrying out uprisings and offensives, offensives and uprising, and ultimately carrying out a general offensive and uprising to defeat the enemy troops." Three strategic blows of strategic war in the South took form and were closely combined: the offensive campaigns of the main-force troops in selected jungles-and-mountains battlefields; combined offensive and uprising campaigns in highly populated rural lowland areas; and political struggle in the cities. "We must strike the three strategic blows simultaneously."

He explained that according to Vietnamese revolutionary theory it was necessary to closely combine offensive with mastery and mastery with offensive, fight the enemy while holding our ground, use strong mobile forces to annihilate large numbers of the enemy, and use strong local forces to wage a war of attrition, for Vietnamese people's war is war by all the people, including both political and armed forces, and fight the enemy both militarily and politically. The Vietnamese people's armed forces include militia and self-defense forces at the basic and village levels which, along with the

people, remain in the locality so that the enemy cannot fragment our area, and tight the enemy in order to defend the basic and village level; includes local troops who serve as the hard core for local people's war and create additional areas of operation and forces in order to continually develop attacks against the enemy and includes mobile main-force troops to fight the enemy on the key battlefields, annihilate large enemy troop elements, and transform the situation on the battlefield. Only thereby can we spread the enemy in order to attack them, fight over a long period of time, and transform a large enemy army into a small one and enemy strengths into weaknesses.

With Regard to building revolutionary forces and base areas, comrade Le Duan always stressed the building of both political forces and armed forces, both open and secret forces, forces from among the basic masses, the intermediate forces which can be won over, and the factions and groups more or less sympathetic toward the revolution which are capable of joining the people in certain actions at certain times; with regard to militia, guerrillas, local troops, and main-force troops (main-force troops of the Military Region, of the South, and troops sent south by the Ministry of National Defense); with regard to base areas and rear areas, base areas of the military regions, bases, rear areas, and the nation as a whole. In many letters, he also affirmed the necessity of building strategic reserve forces, both political forces and military forces, in order to promptly win a decisive victory in the long-range developmental process of the war. He also many times stressed the decisive rule of the socialist north as the great rear area for the great front line in the south; of people's war against the war of destruction and socialist construction by the people and soldiers of the north; and of the great international support and assistance of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist nations for the Vietnamese revolution.

Comrade Le Duan wrote, "The people's democratic national revolution in the South and the socialist revolution in the north are intertwined to form a single revolution, but the greatest, most decisive strength is in the North, in the rear area." In the North, "We are prepared to cope with the worst contingencies and the fraternal countries are prepared to aid us. If the United States foolhardily sends troops to the north, we will also defeat them here. Even if we have to sacrifice tens of thousand of people and even if Hanoi is devastated, the north will fight shoulder-to-shoulder with the south to defeat the U.S. bandits, complete the national liberation undertaking, and unify the nation." "The North is day and night producing and fighting, is concerned with building strategic reserve forces, and is prepared to aid the South fully and promptly."

The military problems dealt with by comrade Le Duan were organically related to the basic problems of the strategic line and strategy and of the revolutionary and revolutionary war methods in the south, and reflected special military science thought, and were highly critical and combative. He was unwilling to restrict himself to the existing viewpoints of military science which many people knew and regarded as "immutable" and which appeared to be "very logical." But was not that formalistic logic which differed entirely from dialectical logic? It may be said that comrade Le Duan, like the other leadership comrades of our Party, represent a unique military doctrine. That is the military doctrine of Vietnam, of Marxism-Leninism in

Vietnam, in which the precious military traditions of Vietnam are combined closely the newest developments of the era, outstanding among which is the organic unity between its revolutionary and popular nature and its modern nature.

The problem that was posed in strategic leadership in the South--revolutionary leadership strategy, revolutionary war strategy, and military strategy--was how to combine the military struggle and the political struggle (and sometimes diplomatic struggle as well) in the different periods in all three strategic areas? In other words, the problem was organizing the war, beginning the war, advancing the war with great leaps forward when there were conditions for doing so, and finally taking advantage of the historic opportunity to conclude the war and win complete victory.

In general, the revolution in the South took place in accordance with the following process: at first, political struggles and partial uprisings arose in a number of rural mountainous and lowland areas. At the same time, political struggles in many legal and illegal forms took place in a number of municipalities and cities. When the enemy used counterrevolutionary violence, followed by the use of counterrevolutionary war and aggressive war to oppose the revolution, the armed uprising developed into revolutionary war. Armed struggle played an increasingly important and decisive role, while political struggle and uprisings were maintained and promoted during the war. The situation developed as Lenin had said, "It is difficult to distinguish uprising from war."

In general, armed struggle and political struggle were combined in all three strategic areas in forms that were appropriate to each area. But political struggle usually took place in the cities, military attacks combined mass uprisings took place primarily in highly populated lowland areas, and the large-scale military offensive campaigns were carried out primarily on the jungles-and-mountains battlefields. Finally, the center of the revolutionary war whirlwind was shifted to the cities, to the enemy headquarters at the central and local levels, in order to conclude the war with complete victory.

In revolutionary war in the South, both the laws of uprising and the laws of war were brought into play and affected each other in all periods. Among them, uprisings play a very important role at the beginning and serve as both a foundation and offensive spearheads for developing the war, and the laws of war play an increasingly decisive role.

The Party Central Committee always adopted correct policies which closely and appropriately combined the military struggle and the political struggle, firmly grasped offensive strategic thought, and resolutely waged long-range struggle; on that basis won step-by-step victories and overthrew the enemy bit by bit; positively created opportunities and took advantage of them to fight strategic, war-deciding battles; won decisive victories in each period, and ultimately launched a general offensive and uprising which won complete victory.

"The strategic slogan of revolutionary war in the South is to fight a protracted war and rely primarily on our own strength" ... "On the basis of

protracted fighting, take advantage of opportunities and endeavor to win a decisive victory in a relatively short period of time." Comrade Le Duan clearly stated his viewpoints regarding decisive victory in war in order to explain our goals and intentions in the strategic war-deciding battles: "When making the decision to win decisive victory we set the requirement of winning basic victories in certain specific situations in the war. That is clearly not the same as winning complete victory in all circumstances."

The author of "Letters to the South" profoundly and accurately analyzed the strategic situation of revolution and revolutionary war in the South and on that basis made the strategic decision of winning decisive victories at opportune times to create turning points in the war that were to our advantage. The Binh Gia and Ba Gia victories (1964-1965) signified the defeat of the U.S.-puppet "special war." The victory of the general offensive and simultaneous uprising during the 1968 Tet signified the defeat of the "limited war" and forced the United States to deescalate the war, end their war of destruction against the North, and negotiate with us at Paris. The victory of the strategic offensive in the South, combined with our victory in smashing the U.S. B-52 raids against the North in 1972, signified the defeat of the "de-Americanization and Vietnamization" strategy and forced the United States to sign the Paris Agreement on Vietnam and withdraw all U.S. and vassal troops from the South.

Comrade Le Duan also set forth the theory of concluding the war and defeating the enemy by surprise and the art of resolving that extremely important. We not only had to be determined to fight and defeat the United States but also had to know how to fight and win: "After knowing how to properly begin and fight a protracted war, we must know how to properly conclude it." It was necessary to enable our entire Party, population, and army to clearly understand the great significance of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation so that they could be more proud and confident, and continually confirmed that nothing could shake our will to fight, and that despite all difficulties and hardships we would overcome everything to win ultimate victory. "On the path to winning complete victory, our final battles must be unexpected ones that are calculated and prepared as meticulously and fully as possible." "The element of surprise is also a matter of law-like nature in the fierce, decisive fighting between ourselves and the enemy." That affirmation by the Secretary General in his "Letters to COSVN" in June 1971 was brilliantly borne out by the great victory of the General Offensive and Uprising of the Spring of 1975. That was also an unexpected victory "in the last 15 minutes of the battle."

The conclusion of comrade Le Duan at the Political Bureau conference that was held between October 1974 and January 1975, as well as the telegrams sent later, were filled with a spirit of combativeness, a spirit of launching a resolute, marvellously rapid offensive that was carefully thought out in order to win a certain victory. "Advance to a strategic war-deciding attack on the enemy's final lair by the most rapid route"; "there is little chance that the Americans will return to intervene in the Vietnam war," but "even if there is only a 5 to 7 percent chance, we must be on guard." The Political Bureau decided that "We must take advantage of the strategic opportunity, carry out a general offensive and uprising, and victoriously conclude the liberation war

in the shortest possible time. Ideally, it will begin and end in April of this year and no later. We must act rapidly, boldly, and unexpectedly. We must attack while the enemy are perplexed and on the decline.

It must be affirmed that the outcome of the great-victory strategic offensive in the spring of 1975 was the inevitable product of the over-all course of a long fight waged by the people and soldiers of the south and the people and soldiers of the entire nation over half a century, beginning with the great victories of the August Revolution and the anti-French resistance war. It originated with the correct leadership of the Party, the skilled strategic guidance of the Political Bureau, the setting of the goals of peace and neutrality for the revolution in the South, the organization of the National Liberation Front, and then the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. There came the correct determination of the main contents of the methods of the revolution and revolutionary war in the South and of the military science and art, along with the simultaneous carrying out of a persistent, principled, and very flexible diplomatic struggle at Paris and winning the sympathy, support, and assistance of the fraternal socialist nations and the entire world revolutionary movement, including progressive Americans. Only by examining the problem in such a way was it possible to explain the great victory of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation waged by the Vietnamese people.

People's war and revolutionary war in the South clearly included many very rich contents which were very different from those of ordinary, "classical" wars fought only by conventional armies. The fought only by conventional armies. The term "revolutionary war" is used not only to distinguish the nature of such war--revolutionary war as compared to counterrevolutionary war and aggressive war, but also contains and manifests the contents of revolution and revolutionary methods. That was the basic mode of the revolution in the South, the goals of which were to overthrow the neocolonial regime, defeat the neocolonial war of aggression fought by the U.S. imperialists, and attain the objectives of the revolution. A war is also a revolution. Revolutionary struggle, popular struggle, political struggle, armed uprisings, etc., are all integrated and closely combined with one another. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Party (3 February 1970), comrade Le Duan conceptualized the contents of the methods of revolution and revolutionary war in the South in the famous work, "Under the glorious Banner of the Party, for Independence, Freedom, and Socialism Advance to the Winning of New Victories." The Fourth Party Congress in 1976 also recapitulated and conceptualized those contents in a succinct and meaningful manner.

Comrade Le Duan was entirely correct when he wrote, "In the present era, there are many kinds of wars which are waged on many different scales and in which many different kinds of weapons are used. But with regard to strength, most worthy of attention are people's war and nuclear war."

It is also very logical that many military strategists in the world regard Vietnamese people's war as a "new invention of the era" and "a miraculous story of the 20th Century."

The book is a person. Through "Letters to the South" we can clearly see a person in whom revolutionary ardor is closely combined with intelligence and revolutionary experience. It analyzed the situation scientifically, combined with wise and bold decisions, in contributing to collective decisions as well as in organizing the implementation of collective decisions. Comrade Le Duan did not wait for all the facts before reaching conclusions and did not wait until all conditions were present before acting. He was a man of action who was full of dynamism, had a broad outlook, was very creative, and relied on firm confidence in the masses, for "in revolution, the masses have limitless creativity." Especially, his living and working conditions enabled him to gain profound understanding of the revolutionary movement in the South and brotherhood tied with the people and soldiers of the South. His sharp theory arose from actual practice and his great intelligence and ability to think independently. He often repeated the immortal words of Lenin, "Truth is specific, revolution is creative." It may be said that "Letters From the South" is lively proof of that.

The clearly understood the limitation of the subjective events: "Events do not always develop as we predicted." However, he stressed the decisive reciprocal effect man has on the objective development of events: "We are still capable of mastering the situation, for every day we guide the resistance war on the basis of the laws of revolutionary war which we have grasped, and also on the basis of enemy intentions which we have correctly predicted." That is historical materialism. The history of mankind develops according to objective laws which are beyond the subjective desires of man, but man makes his own history.

"Letters to the South" and the actualities of combat by our army and people under the leadership of the Party further enriched Marxist-Leninist theory and the revolutionary struggle and armed struggle theory and experience, and the revolutionary science and military science of our people, and have contributed worthily to the treasury of experience of the people of the countries of the world which are struggling for independence, freedom, and socialism.

Today, when reading "Letters to the South" we feel legitimate pride and solid confidence in the wise leadership and strategic skill of our party Central Committee, under the leadership of our beloved Secretary General Le Duan.

"Letters to the South" provides us with a method of scientific thought--the method of dialectical materialism in action--to help us correctly view and creatively resolve real problems in the present revolutionary enterprise. The author of "Letters to the South" not only presents us with precious directives and persuasive theoretical arguments that were borne out in the actual course of events, but--perhaps more important--equips us with a sharp weapon, and provokes and liberates our thought, so that all of us can by ourselves examine and resolve the problems posed by the revolution.

"Letters to the South" is a collection of historical documents which contributes to recapitulating the experiences, and preparing the history, of the sacred anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation. At the same time, it further illuminates the books and periodicals written on that topic, both those written by us and those written by people on the other side, with regard

to truthful people and those who misunderstand history, and even those who want to distort the truth.

"Letters to the South" represents only part of what comrade Le Duan has said and written about the revolution in the South. It also represents only a small part of what he has said and written about the anti-U.S. resistance war. The over-all anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation is a synthesis of of the revolutionary war and the revolutions in the two regions: the people's national democratic revolution and the liberation war in the South were closely combined with the socialist revolution and people's war to defend socialism in the North.

However, as a collection of official letters from the party Comrade with principal responsibility for the revolution in the South, which passed on, explained, and organized the implementation of the resolutions of the Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau, assessments of the battlefield situations, and directives to the leadership comrades and front commanders, the attractive book "Letters to the South" plays an especially important role in the works of comrade Le Duan on the revolution in the South and the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation.

The publication of this important work by comrade Le Duan on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the liberation of the South and the complete victory of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation is truly a very significant event.

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CSO: 4209/14

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPLEMENTATION OF MILITARY OBLIGATION LAW REVIEWED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Call Up Youths for Induction in Accordance with Policy, Ensure Quality"]

[Text] During the recent period many cities and municipalities, along with the local military organs, have held conferences to review the 3 years during which the Military Obligation Law has been implemented. That was a very practical task for enabling the implementation of the Military Obligation Law in the localities to continually improve and attain high quality.

During the past 3 years the localities, fully understanding the two strategic missions of our country's revolution in the new revolutionary phase--building and defending the homeland--and clearly realizing the strategic significance of building a strong national defense of all the people, and a revolutionary, conventional people's army that is sufficiently strong to defeat all enemy aggressors, have made many efforts to organize the implementation of the Military Obligation Law. Every year tens of thousands of youths from the localities, organs, and schools have enthusiastically set out to enlist and have contributed to increasing the strength of the armed forces, and after returning to the localities after fulfilling their military obligation tens of thousands of youths have continued to engage in production labor to build the nation and serve as positive nuclei in the militia and self-defense forces, thus creating many positive factors for our country's socialist revolution. However, in conferences to implement the Military obligation Law in the localities a number of deficiencies and weaknesses have been revealed in the youth induction campaigns in some places which must be promptly corrected. Although there have been extensive education and study about that law, and many localities have made concerted efforts, there is still a lack of depth or concentration has been focused on only the main category: draft-age youths. The law has not been strictly enforced and in places there still exist the negative phenomena, such as chasing after numbers and failing to pay attention to quality. There have even been instances of opposition and of induction not being strictly and tightly controlled.

The experiences of the localities which have done a good job of inducting youths during the past several years, such as Long An Province, Dong Trien District in Quang Ninh, Hoa Vang District in Quang Nam-Da Nang, Precinct 11 in

Ho Chi Minh City, Vu Ban District in Ha Nam Ninh, and the villages of Vu Di in Vinh Phu, Mong Phong and Binh Duong in Quang Ninh, etc., have clearly demonstrated that implementing the Military Obligation Law is a mission of the entire Party, population, and that if only one link in the over-all process breaks down good results cannot be attained. In all families, if parents do not fully understand the policy and do not encourage their children, youths who set out to join the army are not enthusiastic, which affects the fulfillment of their missions. If the head of an organ or enterprise does not, in certain specific circumstances, place the common benefit of national security above the benefit of his small group, there can easily arise the phenomenon of retaining personnel, which creates difficulties for troop recruitment.

A very topical matter is the quality of troops. The army units of course have a very great responsibility toward training youths on active duty. but before becoming troops they must be mature youths who have "taken on" certain qualities. That is the result of a process of education by society and the families. Those results exert a considerable effect on the quality of troops. Therefore, in order to have the troops we want society must make all-out efforts. Education to explain the contents of the Military Obligation Law must be carried out among all categories in order to fully bring into play the responsibility of the echelons, sectors, localities, organs, and mass organizations. Furthermore, study of the strict and correct application of the law in each youth induction campaign will create a large source of mobilization for the armed forces branches and cause youths to enthusiastically fulfill their sacred obligation toward the homeland. Instances of the arbitrary application of the law, the lack of fairness, failure of cadres to set good examples, or failure of the localities to pay adequate attention to organizing the living conditions of and providing jobs for youths who return after fulfilling their obligations also bring about adverse consequences.

Whenever army units are stationed they are responsible for coordinating with the localities in carrying out education regarding the Military obligation Law and encouraging youths to enthusiastically fulfill their responsibility to defend the homeland. When a new recruit joins a unit the foremost responsibility of the echelons is to be concerned with the material lives and morale of the men, forge and educate them, and create all conditions for everyone to become good soldiers of the people's army who have a strong fighting will, have consciousness of organization and strict discipline, have good combat skills, and fulfill all combat and work missions. The time a youth spends on active duty is very short in comparison to a citizen's obligation under the Military Obligation Law. Therefore, every time unit members complete their active duty period, before they leave the unit favorable conditions must be created for them to carry on the army's fine tradition when they return to their localities and enthusiastically participate in production labor, and positively participate in the militia, self-defense, and reserve mobilization forces so that they can be prepared to take up arms and fight when needed by the homeland.

5616

CSO: 4209/646

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPROVEMENT OF TROOPS' ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT ABILITY URGED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Improve the Economic Management Ability of Troops Doing Economic Work"]

[Text] At present, there has taken form in our army a considerable number of units which engage directly in economic construction. Those units have gained a number of initial experiences in economic management, but production is still a very new mission for our army. The economic management ability of our cadres is still very limited. Nearly all of the units still maintain the subsidizing management mechanism. Implementing Resolution 8 of the Party Central Committee, the units are strongly promoting the improvement of management and are advancing to the elimination of bureaucratism and subsidizing and are changing over completely to economic accounting and socialist commerce. The highest principle of production and commerce is to use income to cover expenses and ensure increasingly greater profits. Therefore, it is necessary to change the methods of management and production, which are affected by many relationships and consist of many components and factors, and apply them in accordance with laws which differ from those encountered in combat. The work of managing and coordinating the elements and factors of the production process to attain a production goal is very important. In order to do a good job of fulfilling the economic construction missions, in addition to increasing their determination, revolutionary ardor, and knowledge of science and technology it is necessary to pay attention to improving the management knowledge and ability of the cadres in units fulfilling economic construction missions.

Economic management is a science and there are specific modes and requirements for each specific management objective. Therefore, the work of improving the economic management knowledge and ability must be appropriate to each management objective, i.e. its contents and forms must be based on the missions of each unit. All cadres doing economic management work must not only have economic management knowledge but must also fully understand basic scientific-technical and social science matters that are relative to their management objectives. Economic management must have a very complicated structure, which requires a corps of cadres who have been trained in many professional subjects. In addition to people who do general management work, there are some who fulfill such management functions as planning, statistics,

financial accounting, etc., so training must intended to create uniformity throughout the management process.

The recent experiences of some units show that in order to improve the management ability of the cadres under conditions of their having to simultaneously study and work, the units must combine training in basic economic management theory by means of concentrated study in the form of short-term training classes on specific management topics, or isolating economic management experiences of the advanced model units. Furthermore, on the basis of planning the corps of cadres the units must have plans for the step-by-step training of economic management cadres in the state and army management schools.

Improving economic management ability is the responsibility not only of the cadres directly doing economic work but also of all cadres and men in units fulfilling economic construction missions. The units must create all conditions and have plans for disseminating general economic management knowledge to the enlisted men. Only if they have economic knowledge can everyone know how to bring into play their collective mastership right, voluntarily observe the management regulations, and contribute effectively to the units' general economic management.

Improving management ability is now an urgent demand and one of the important measures for the units to have conditions for rapidly changing over completely to economic accounting and socialist commerce, ensuring that production develops with increasingly greater effectiveness, and contributing to the victorious implementation of the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the Party Central Committee.

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CSO: 4209/645

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID

DONG NAI, KOMPONG THOM COOPERATE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Main Van Man: "All-Round Cooperation Between Dong Nai and Kompong Thom"]

[Text] The solidarity and cooperative relationship between the two brotherhood provinces of Dong Nai and Kompong Thom have developed strongly and effectively since the overthrow of the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime, lackeys of the Beijing reactionary clique. The party organization and people of Dong Nai regards the mission of economic, cultural, and social construction and development, and the consolidation of national defense, as one of their missions.

Dong Nai has sent specialists to help its friends build its revolutionary administration and develop its economy, culture, and society. The two provinces continually send delegations of party-governmental-mass association delegates to visit and exchange opinions and participate in the congresses of mass associations. Dong Nai and Kompong Thom have signed economic-technical contracts to help our friends develop comprehensively and solidly advance economic construction and the strengthening of national defense.

Many cadres and skilled technical workers in Dong Nai have gone to help our friends with regard to capital construction, water conservancy, public health, and education; help our friends train technical workers and economic, cultural, and social management cadres; sent equipment, machinery, and suitable crop varieties and breeding stock; and help our friends build economic-social projects intended to develop production and serve the people's lives. The "Dong Nai-Kompong Thom friendship projects" extend down to the districts and villages. In 1985 Dong Nai will help Kompong Thom with such projects as repairing the 30-9 water conservancy works, building a brick and tile enterprise with a capacity of 3.5 million bricks and tiles a year, expanding the wood processing and wood items, building the water works of Kompong Thom city, building a sugar enterprise with a capacity of 20 tons a day, and surveying, designing, and building the main roads in the province. By means of their "small plan" activities, the teenagers and children have contributed money to buy equipment for our friends teenagers' clubs.

The Vietnam-Cambodia friendship chapters propagandized and educated the cadres and people regarding the solidarity, fraternal friendship, and all-round cooperation between Vietnam and Cambodia in general and between Dong Nai and Kompong Thom specifically. Each step in the maturation of Kompong Thom positively inspires and encourages Dong Nai to compete in construction and development, and work together for the revolutionary undertaking of the three Indochinese countries.

During the past 6 years, Kompong Thom has grown up in many respects and has built many economic and cultural material bases to serve the lives of the people. That was a result of years of diligent, creative labor and strong advance of the cadres and people of Kompong Thom, with the assistance and fraternal, comradely assistance of the cadres and people of Dong Nai Province.

The flowers of Dong Nai and Kompong Thom are displaying their color and spreading perfume in the flower garden of fraternal friendship among the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia under free skies.

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CSO: 4209/656

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

IN-KIND PAYMENTS TO HANOI ARMED FORCES END

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Article: "In-kind Payments to Hanoi Armed Forces Will Be Changed to Money Payments at the New Prices"]

[Text] Implementing the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the Party Central Committee (fifth term) on prices, salaries, and money, since 1 August 1985 Hanoi will change in-kind payments to cadres, workers, civil servants, and armed forces members stationed in the Hanoi area into monetary payments at the new prices. On the basis of the special characteristics of the armed forces, the replacement of in-kind payments by monetary payments at the new prices to professional officers and military personnel, and to national defense workers and civil servants, will be carried out as follows:

1. Professional officers and military personnel and national defense workers who have received ration stamps and coupons for family allowances will receive supplementary payments in money and compensate for the prices of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, as is the case with regard to municipal cadres, workers, and civil servants. But they will not be paid supplementary payments for grain because they can still buy grain in the units at supply prices, based on the monthly standards. Furthermore, with regard to cloth and the six unrationed goods, the professional officers and enlisted men and the national defense workers and civil servants there will be no supplementary payments because they can still buy them at supply prices or at guidance prices.

2. The professional officers and military personnel and national defense workers and civil servants who live collectively will continue to receive grain, foodstuffs, and manufactured goods at the old supply prices. The Municipal Financial Service will make price supplement payments to the supply sectors and assume responsibility for supply the troops. Units which purchase such supplied goods according to plan, according to monthly or quarterly goods distribution plans at stores in the precincts and districts, need only write checks at the old supply prices and submit them directly to the stores, without working through the precinct and district financial offices. The Municipal Financial Service will make price supplement payments directly to the precinct and district financial bureaus.

3. In the case of dependents of married couples both of whom are military personnel or national defense workers and civil servants and who have been issued ration stamps and coupons and grain purchasing booklets, the subprecincts will do the paperwork for the issuing of price supplements. In the case of members of households living in collective military housing areas who are classified as dependents, not receive ration coupons not from the subprecincts but from the financial bureaus of the precincts and districts, which will draw up a register and request the Financial Service grant monetary supplements (via the Financial Department and the Ministry of National Defense). With regard to dependents of officers and national defense workers and civil servants who, because of the location of their parents' work do not live with them:

--If in the past they were declared as dependents of others who were cadres, workers, or civil servants, they will continue to receive price supplements in such places.

--If in the past they registered as members of a neighborhood, the subprecinct people's committee will make confirmations and recommend that the precinct make price supplements directly to them.

With regard to dependents of armed forces members who only receive monthly grain standards and rations, they will temporarily be excluded from the current round of price supplements.

4. In addition to price supplements to salaries, officers and national defense workers and civil servants in the armed forces both those who live collectively and those who live with their families) still receive the 15 percent family allowance, base on salaries after price supplements have been made.

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25 October 1985

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

HO CHI MINH CITY REORGANIZES FOOD SERVICE NETWORK

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Bang Chau: "Ho Chi Minh Reorganizes Food Service Network"]

[Text] In recent years the Ho Chi Minh restaurant and hotel sector has promoted market transformation and management. In the past there were 31,206 individual food service operators but now there are now 21,300, a reduction of 9,906. It was also the first sector in the city to carry out cooperation and joint operations with the big merchants in order to use their technical facilities and capital and gradually bring food services into the organized market, including state, joint operations, and marketing cooperative sectors. In Precinct 5, the precinct in the city which has the most large restaurants, during the first 6 months of 1985 the number of merchants doing business in the food services sector declined. However, "carousing" is still a problem with which we must be concerned with resolving by teaching a frugal way of life and organizing the food services sector. The Municipal Party Committee and the Municipal People's Committee have adopted many policies on that topic, but some wards, districts, subwards, and villages have not yet strictly implemented them. Noteworthy is the fact that some places still regard the food services business as a secondary source of "transfer payments" and use it as a means to increase the budget for improving the living conditions of the local cadres. According to stipulations by the city, class A and Class B merchants in the food services business will be transformed by the precincts or by the municipal food services corporation, or will be formed into jointly operated cooperatives, and class C merchants will be managed by the subprecincts. But because they have pursued profits and relaxed their management of that task, some places have allowed class A merchants to collude with subprecinct marketing cooperatives and organs, agreed upon a formula for sharing profits, and openly displayed signs advertising party foods under the guise of "internal canteens." In Precinct 5, 17 class A merchants and 29 class B merchants should be managed by the precinct food services corporation but instead "work" with the subprecincts. In Precinct 1, according to incomplete data more than organs and units which have nothing to do with the food services sector have opened "internal canteens," but serve all elements of society and arrange wedding feasts, birthday parties, and celebrations. Because they pursued profits in the food services sector, some marketing cooperatives in precincts 1, 3, 5, 6, and 11 at first only sold fresh foodstuffs for the workers' two meals or sold ordinary times, but now

they specialize in special items. some precincts and districts have opened floating restaurants with live music, accompanied by very high prices.

Because their prices are too high, they are prepared to pay any prices for grain and food products. Every day, 21,000 private restaurants consume 54 tons of high-quality rice, 20 tons of pork, 7 tons of beef, 11 tons of poultry, 9 tons of glutinous rice, etc. That does not include seasonings and the other secondary ingredients. That is a considerable pressure which causes prices in the city to continually fluctuate and considerably affects the pocketbooks of the workers. The customers of the specialized restaurants include a considerable number of cadres, after which money and goods contracts with the state are "disembowled."

In addition to eating one must also mention drinking. In Precinct 3, there are 450 of all kinds, and that does not include the state-operated and consumer cooperatives (in one day they consume 370 kilograms of coffee and if all cafes in precincts 1, 5, 6, 10, and 11, are included the amount of coffee consumed increases to tens of tons. Morning, noon, afternoon, and night the cafes are crowded and most of the customers are youths. Along less than 100 meters of Truong Minh Ky Street in Precinct 3 there are four large cafes. Cafe 60 on Nguyen Dinh Chieu Street in Precinct 1, which displays a sign saying "Library" but sells many kinds of coffee in a manner contrary to the way of life of socialist culture. Cafe 245 in Binh Thanh Precinct and many other cafes are similar. The precincts have dealt sternly with such phenomena. Temporary cafes continue to exist in some places. Many false rumors are spread in such cafes.

Why do such commercial phenomena continue to exist? The management and reorganization of the private food services have not yet received adequate attention by the precincts, districts, subprecincts, and villages. Although the food services sector has not issued them business permits, more than 2,000 individual food services merchants in precincts 1, 4, 6 and 8 have since the end of 1984 displayed business licenses issued by the subprecincts. That does not include many organs and enterprises opening restaurants in the guise of "canteens." The Restaurant and Hotel Service also said that only 30 percent of the merchants in the restaurant sector have legal permits granted by the precinct and district people's committees while 40 percent have been issued "receipts" and 30 percent have no permits.

The chairman of the Municipal People's Committee pointed out that promoting production to accumulate capital is an important mission, but accumulation does not necessarily mean pursuing restaurant services which adversely affecting the life and culture of the city and the spirit and thought of the people who are fighting on the front lines of the homeland and working hard everywhere.

Implementing the directive of the Municipal Party Committee, the precincts and districts have begun to rectify the restaurant trade. Garish signs advertising special dishes have gradually disappeared from the restaurants. A number of cooperatives are reviewing the transformation of specialized restaurants into restaurants which serve workers. The food services network must be reorganized and there must be unity among the precincts, district,

subprecincts, and villages, among which the subprecinct echelon plays an important role in managing and overseeing the restaurant sector. It is also necessary to determine the acceptable ratio of specialized restaurants, process popular dishes and ensure sanitation and moderate prices. Socialist commerce and services are endeavoring to advance strongly in order to control the market, continually improve the quality of service, contribute positively to market management, and build a civilized and economical way of life. In decentralizing management the subwards must pay attention to creating teams to provide morning meals at prices appropriate to the legitimate incomes of workers. On the basis of expanding organized commerce and service, they must restrict the private restaurant business and reorganize the network in the subprecincts and precincts and throughout the city. That is an essential task for fulfilling the requirement of changing the payment of salaries in part by in-kind goods to the payment of salaries in money only and the observance of the stipulated prices.

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CSO: 4209/654

AGRICULTURE

RAPID INTRODUCTION OF TECHNICAL AGRICULTURAL ADVANCES URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Dang, Vice Minister of Agriculture: "Technical Advances Must Rapidly Be Introduced into Agricultural Production This Year"]

[Text] Many localities attained high yields and output during the recent winter-spring production season. Our peasants are beginning the 10th month season and are determined to produce a bumper crop in 1985, the concluding year of the 1981-1985 5-year plan, create momentum, and create a basis for the 1986-1990 5-year plan.

The actual situation during the past several years and the recent winter-spring season shows that cooperatives and production collectives in the same ecological area and similar material conditions which have good management and do a better job of applying technical advances attain higher yields and output than the other places.

In the 1985 state plan grain output must reach 19 million tons. Rice output will increase by more than 1 million tons over 1984. Eighty percent of that increase will be due to intensive cultivation. With regard to animal husbandry, we will continue to comprehensively develop all kinds of livestock in all three sectors--to increase the food supply to meet the domestic and export needs and increase fertilizer and draft power for cultivation.

Thus the 1985 agricultural production plan includes the following principal contents: applying the line of intensive cultivation in agriculture, while also comprehensively developing agriculture, including cultivation, animal husbandry, and the trades, and endeavoring to attain high yields, quality, and economic effectiveness. There must be a strong reorientation in the export mission of the agricultural sector, with emphasis on rapidly increase the supply of agricultural products and processed agricultural products for export and create conditions for domestic production to develop and create additional sources of accumulation for the economy in general. The mission of developing production must be tied in with increasing the material bases of agriculture, quickly applying scientific-technical accomplishments to production, and creating a basis on which to draft production plans, and regard that as an effective way to ensure that the agricultural development norms are fulfilled in all phases of the plan.

On the basis of the results and experiences in introducing technical advances into production in recent years, especially in 1984, the Ministry of Agriculture has determined the key state technical progress topics for 1985, which are intended to meet the following principal goals of agricultural production:

1. Rapidly introducing the high-yield, high-resistance rice varieties into production. Determining the rice variety structures in the different ecological areas. Applying technical advances to rice production in a combined manner and creating intensive rice cultivation models which attain rice yields of 10 tons per year on a large area.
2. Applying the intensive cultivation measures and programs to prevent and eliminate rice-harming insects and diseases in the districts.
3. Applying technical advances regarding the rational use of fertilizer to increase crop yields and improve soil.
4. Rapidly bringing high-yield corn varieties into production and applying intensive corn cultivation programs intended to attain yields of 30 to 35 tons per hectare in concentrated corn areas.
5. Rapidly bringing high-yield peanut varieties into production, applying intensive peanut cultivation programs in the different soil areas, especially peanut production on hill land.
6. Expanding the growing of high-yield soybean varieties and the soybean intensive cultivation measures, and producing and using nitrogen in order to increase soybean yields.
7. Applying the technical advances to improve the quality of breeding boars and sows by managing and registering national breeds, overseeing breed selection, determining appropriate cross-breed breeds for each area, surveying and building breeding sow and boar herds, and stepping up artificial insemination to serve commercial hog breeding in the different ecological areas.
8. Building and perfecting the system of veterinary medicine stations extending from the central level down to the local level to care for livestock, prevent and fight livestock diseases, and advance to eliminating the three principal hog diseases--erysipelas, cholera, and pasteurellosis--in future years.
9. Applying technical advances in the production of feed supplemented with vitamins, minerals, antibiotics, etc., and the production of concentrated animal feed that meets state standards.
10. Using Zebu and Sindhi cattle to improve Vietnamese yellow cattle, so that by 1990 Vietnamese yellow cattle will have been interbred with Sindhi cattle to the extent that they have 25 to 85 Sindhi blood, beginning with the 80,000 cattle of the state farms.

11. Applying technical advances to the production of cross-bred dual-line silkworms with the following content: egg incubation techniques, techniques for raising basic, Class 1, and Class 2 silkworms, techniques for producing purebred varieties and the F1 crossbred variety, microscopic techniques for inspecting silkworm diseases, and techniques for refrigerating, acid-treating, and storing silkworm to ensure sufficient good breeding stock for production.

12. Rapidly introducing mechanized equipment to serve intensive rice cultivation: equipment to spread nitrogenous fertilizer below the surface, foot-powered rice threshing wheels, hand-powered water pumps, and plastic insecticide sprayers.

13. Applying technical advances to expand the seasonal raising of commercial crossbred ducks and the industrial-style raising of chickens in the state and family sectors.

The drafting of plans and their implementation in 13 key technical progress programs in 1985 will be carried out in two ways:

--The technical advances or the principal contents of technical advances which are applicable to production must be drafted in the form of plan norms applied in production in all central and local bases, to ensure the balancing of all aspects of the implementation process (for example, with regard to interbreeding Sindhi and Vietnamese cattle it is necessary to draft annual plan norms and assign them to the state farms, the enterprise federations, and the localities which raise Sindhi breeding cattle or cross-breed Sindhi cattle which meet standards for direct breeding or the production of fresh or dry-frozen sperm).

--The other technical advances will be planned and implemented on the scale of large models (district models) in the different agricultural ecology areas. It is necessary to ensure all conditions for the technical advances to be implemented as effectively as possible in production.

In drafting plans it is necessary to be able to calculate the specific economic effectiveness of the technical advances in terms of percentage of the annual increase in agricultural production. The method used to calculate the effectiveness of technical advances has been estimation, and they have not been separated from the other factors contributing to the increase in production. Therefore, while awaiting a method to calculate the economic effectiveness of the application of technical advances in a manner appropriate to the conditions of Vietnam, we can apply the method of calculating the economic effectiveness of economic advances employed by the Soviet Union: $AEF = (NV - OV) - (NE - OE) \times V$, in which AEF is the annual economic effectiveness of the introduction of new technical advances. NV and OV are the old total production per unit and the new total production per unit from the application of new techniques. NE and OE are the new value of expenses per unit with the application of technical advances and the old value of expenses per unit. V is the total volume per unit with the application of new techniques.

Applied specifically to rice, we have: $AEF = (NY - OY) - (NE - OE) \times S$, with NY and OY being the old rice yield and the new rice yield, NE and OE being the new expense and the old expense, and S being the cultivated area on which the technical advances are applied (values are calculated in terms of paddy).

The enterprise of building Vietnamese agriculture and developing it comprehensively, strongly, and solidly along the lines of intensive cultivation, specialized cultivation, and advancement to large-scale socialist production, demands the rapid introduction of technical advances to production. That must be regarded as one of the urgent missions at present. With the results and experiences that have been attained, although only initial ones, in the application of technical advances to production in 1984, we have a basis for believing that with the spirit of diligence and creativity, and strong sense of responsibility, of the large corps of agricultural scientific-technical cadres, and with the ability to assimilate the new and the dynamism of the production bases it is certain that we will achieve greater accomplishments in 1985 and in future years.

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CSO: 4209/653

AGRICULTURE

MY VAN DISTRICT SEEKS TO OVERCOME DROUGHT, COMPLETE PLANTING

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Tran Hung: "Last Days of the Planting Period at My Van"]

[Text] Like the other places in the Bac Bo lowlands, during the present planting season My Van District in Hai Hung Province has encountered prolonged severe heat and its fields, which already experiencing difficulties with regard to irrigation water, are experiencing serious drought.

We visited the district during the last days of the planting period.

At our suggestion, the head of the tractor station took us to the area experiencing the greatest difficulty with regard to irrigation water, consisting of the villages of Lac Da, Chi Dao, Dai Dong, Tan Hung, and Viet Hung. Only when we reached that area did we fully realize the difficulties the production base have experienced and are continuing to overcome in order to complete planting during the shortest period of time. Because of the fierce sun and heat, the underground and surface canals were dry. The canal banks had been cut into segments by the bailing channels. The people bailed water from the irrigation ditches, the drainage ditches, depressions, ponds, and runoff ditches, and even cut bailing channels across roads. According to local comrades, only rarely has there been a year with such bad drought conditions. The fields were alive with color. On the plots which had been transplanted first the rice had root and had "come back to life." The plots that had just been transplanted still had the reddish yellow color of rice seedlings. The plots that had just been prepared for planting were still dry, and the recent plowing of the rest of the fields had turned over grey soil. Here and there were scattered about bailing buckets, pneumatic and wire cage tractor tires, oil drums, and baskets of manure and rice seedlings. People, water buffaloes, oxen, and machinery were busily at work.

We went to the Dong Xa area, a land reclamation area in La Dao village hundreds of may in extent. Furthermore, the area had been plowed by tractor and the turned furrows were discolored and dry as if they had been dry-plowed at the end of the year. The comrades driving the black, decrepit tractors appeared to be doing extremely hard work and were working day and night. Those fields were experiencing the greatest difficulties, especially with regard to water, because complete irrigation systems. That is also the

"hottest topic" of the district production guidance committees. The water conservancy and tractor sectors are positively helping provide irrigation water and prepare the soil so that Lac Dao can essentially complete the transplanting of its fields by 15 August, the final date for planting in the district. According to the director of the Lac Dao cooperative, despite the serious drought the cooperative has maintained a structure of 500 mau of early 10th month rice in order to put out a winter crop. With regard to the seasonal schedule, this year the early 10th month rice was planted 10 days later than normal. But so that the rice can develop rapidly and be harvested early, the cooperative concentrated on tending and fertilizing the rice as soon as it was transplanted and on retaining sufficient water for irrigation, so the rice has developed quite well. To ensure sufficient water, it must be bailed every day. Two days after water is bailed into a field it is again dry. Today water is bailed into one field and tomorrow it is bailed into another field, and the cycle is repeated for several fields.

Some district cadres in charge of water conservancy had recently returned from Dai Dong village. Their hands and feet were still dirty and they were very sweaty. After sipping a bit of tea, the head of the water conservancy office pulled out a notebook and read statistics about the electricity that had been supplied during the various periods of time, the operating hours of each pumping station, and the number of mau in the cooperatives that had not yet been transplanted. During the present season My Van has used 85 tons of oil to fight drought. The district has mobilized in all more than 100 diesel-powered pumps and has also used four tractor engines to help out in the pumping. At the Dai Dong cooperative, all of the water pumped into a canal by a pump with a capacity of 1,000 cubic meters an hour was bailed out by hand by hundreds of bailers, so no water flowed to the end of the canal, which was several kilometers long.

The leadership comrades the District People's Committee received us under the light of an oil lamp. They said that during the recent fifth month-spring the district's rice yield was 42.57 quintals per hectare, of May the district began its 10th month rice season production. But this year the fifth month-spring rice was harvested 15 to 20 days late, so the most difficult problem for the district was that it had to complete the planting of the 10th month crop within 30 days. Thus the production situation, especially with regard to water and soil preparation, was very tense. In view of that situation, from the beginning of May, before the fifth month-spring rice had been harvested, the district sought to obtain water to irrigate 3,000 hectare by gravity flow, in order to spread out the soil preparation period and reduce the the degree of tenseness.

The heat continued from one day to another. The area with too little water for soil preparation gradually spread and the situation became increasingly serious. Two thousands hectares were completely dry. The seasonal schedule had begun but electricity was supplied in small amounts and irregularly. The district had to request permission from the province to change its plan to fight waterlogging during the 10th month season and bring in gravity-fed water once again, in mid-July, for more than 4,000 low-lying fields. Since 27 July the supply of electricity was concentrated on increasing the production rate.

My Van has a plan to plant 13,800 hectares of 10th month rice. By 18 July the district had only planted 300 hectares. However, after working with us 92 percent of the 10th month rice was planted by 7 August, within the seasonal framework. Sixteen villages essentially completed their planting. The bases are going all-out to fulfill and surpass the planting plan norms, fight drought, and positively apply crop tending and intensive cultivation measures to attain the stipulated yield, while at the same time strengthening the regional and area dikes, preparing to fight waterlogging, and maintaining the rice area. Those are central missions which the party organization and people of My Van are determined to fulfill.

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CSO: 4209/656

AGRICULTURE

NORTH FIGHTS DROUGHT, SOUTH CONCENTRATES ON PLANTING

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Aug 85 p 1

[Article: "North Continues To Fight Drought, Transplant Rest of Area So That It Can Change Over to Tending 10th Month Rice; South Concentrates on Planting"]

[Text] Recently the weather has continued to be hot (in some localities there has been light rain but the volume of rainfall has been small). According to data of the Ministry of Water Conservancy, the drought-affected area amounts to 100,000 hectares, or to more than 200,000 hectare if one includes the water-deficient area.

With the positive support of the electricity sector and the water conservancy sector, during the first part of August the northern localities have concentrated most of their forces on fighting drought and planting 10th month rice. The provinces of Ha Nam Ninh, Thai Binh, and Hai Hung have transplanted their entire two-rice-crop area and transplanted the remaining parts of the rice seedling land, subsidiary food crop land, and industrial crop land. Most of the labor in those provinces is changing over to tending the 10th month crop and carrying out the first weeding. Ha Nam Ninh and Nghe Tinh provinces have completed the first weeding on 40 to 60 percent of the transplanted rice. although their planting rate has increased recently, they did not transplant their entire areas before August 7. The best time for transplanting 10th month rice has passed. The northern localities must urgently transplant and direct-sow the remaining area and change over to tending the rice. Insects and diseases are tending to develop rapidly on the newly transplanted rice. The localities must actively guard against and promptly eliminate insects and diseases to prevent them from spreading.

In the southern provinces, in general the 10th month rice planting rate is slower than at the same time last year. Except for An Giang and Dong Thap, which have nearly completed their transplanting, the provinces have attained only 20 to 40 percent of their area plan norms. The localities in the south must concentrate on harvesting the rest of the summer-fall rice and on preparing the soil to transplant the 10th month rice. Hau Giang, Minh Hai, and Long An provinces, which have large water-deficient areas, must take the initiative in creating sources of water to fight drought in order to broadcast sow the rice on time.

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CSO: 4209/656

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SMALL HYDROPOWER PROJECTS URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Aug 85 pp 2, 4

[Article by Lo Tat Huan, head of the Project Design Institute of the Ministry of Forestry: "Many Small and Very Small Hydroelectric Projects Should Be Built"]

[Text] Our country has thousands of small rivers and streams distributed throughout the midlands and the mountain region. Most of those rivers and streams have flowing water the year round, with volumes varying from a few hundred liters per second to tens of cubic meters per second. The streams vary in slope from a few percent to tens of percent. Especially, in many places, because the geological structures and elevations, the flow of water has created rapids with elevation variations of from tens of meters to hundreds of meters, or even thousands of meters. Such natural conditions have created for our country rich, varied water energy resources which are very easily exploited and are distributed uniformly in the midlands and mountain regions and nationwide. We need only have a small canal, a ditch, a turbine, and a generator to have electricity.

Recently our party and state have appealed for the construction of small hydroelectric stations. Within a period of only a few years hundreds of small hydroelectricity stations with scales of from a few kW to thousands of kW, which have created sources of energy for the localities and not only provided electricity for daily life but also provided a notable source of power for industrial and agricultural production. However, the matter raised here is not large-scale hydroelectricity projects or small-scale hydroelectric projects in general, but extremely small hydroelectric installations in the forestry sector (according to the currently accepted method of classification, small hydroelectricity ranges from a few hundred kW to under 5,000 kW, capacities under which are classified as extremely small). That is a special characteristic because it has its special reasons. With 15 million hectares of forests and forest land, the midlands and mountain regions are the sources of origin of the small streams, which join together to form large streams and empty into rivers.

At present there are hundreds thousands of cadres, workers, and civil servants in the forestry sector, and several million ethnic minority people who live and work in the forest areas. Due to the production conditions, they

must live scattered out over a large area in rugged mountainous terrain in which roads and travel facilities are very limited. Under the present conditions and in the near future, our country's electricity output will be very low, despite the completion of the Hoa Binh and Tri An hydroelectric stations. Furthermore, because they live scattered about in rugged terrain it will be many more years before the national electricity grid is extended throughout the mountain region.

Under such circumstances, forestry production needs much energy to saw and process wood in the forests, and forestry cadres and workers need electricity to improve their working and living conditions, which have been beset with difficulties, deprivations, and hardships. At the same time, several million ethnic minority people are greatly in need of energy to improve their working conditions, daily lives, and material conditions.

During the past several years, implementing the policy of our Party and state to develop small hydroelectricity installations, the leadership cadres of the Ministry of Forestry have promptly responded to that policy and assigned to the Project Design Institute of the Ministry of Forestry responsibility for drafting plans, surveying, and designing, and signed contracts with the Dong Anh Electrical Equipment Corporation of the Ministry of Power, the Water Conservancy Machinery Factory of the Ministry of Water Conservancy, and the Electrical Goods Factory of the Ministry of Engineering and Metals while at the same time directly sending cadres to guide construction. In a period of less than 2 years, 20 small and very hydroelectric stations were surveyed and designed and 7 were completed and began to produce electricity for use in illumination to serve the people's lives. Preparations are being made to use electricity to saw and process wood in the forests. The Hong Duc hydroelectricity station of the Tan Phong state forest and the Bac Yen Forestry-Industry Federation, which has a capacity of 15 KVA, a dam 8 meters high, and a penstock 7 meters high, was completed in 3 months and has been used for illumination on a stable basis for nearly 2 months.

Although hydroelectricity construction is simple, that does not mean that there are no difficulties. At times there is a shortage of materials and at times it is necessary to cope with seasonal floods during construction. But all of those difficulties and hardships have been overcome. The Chuc A hydroelectricity station of the Chuc A state farm in Nghe Tinh, which has a capacity of 35 kW, a dam 5 meters high, a conduit 50 meters long, and a flow of 1.3 cubic meters per second, was completed in 5 months and has produced electricity to illuminate 400 75-watt bulbs all over the state farm and the neighboring residential area for nearly a year. It is very regrettable that the state farm has not yet used electricity to process wood.

In addition to the initial accomplishments we have also encountered defeats. Due to failure to fully predict the strength of floodwater in small streams, in 1984, after two hydroelectricity stations were constructed in units 5 and 8 of the Ba Ren state farm, flooding at the beginning of the rainy season washed away the dams, the machinery was inundated, and this year the stations had to be rebuilt. We also failed when we built a hydroelectricity station at the Quy Chau state forest of the Song Hieu forestry-industry federation.

However, after the completion of a number of hydroelectricity stations we have made a number of observations: the construction of hydroelectricity stations in the agricultural sector is relatively simple. There are many things that must be taken into consideration because at present materials and labor costs are still subsidized, but even so that is a form of energy that is very easily exploited and is very economical.

The construction of small hydroelectricity projects had the following advantages:

--They can be built in many places (according to preliminary calculations it is possible to build several thousand stations with scales of 5 kW to 500 kW on agricultural land).

--It is not necessary to create reservoirs, so no agricultural land is used.

--It is possible to maintain the watershed forests because our experience shows that in places which build hydroelectricity projects the cadres, workers, and ethnic minority people know how to protect their watershed forests to maintain the sources of water. Thus the environment is also protected.

--It is possible to create jobs for cadres, workers, and the ethnic minority people and to stop shifting cultivation and habitation and the burning of forests to build slash-burn fields.

--The electricity that is produced is fully utilized: it is used for illumination at night and production during the day.

--The distance electricity must be transmitted from the stations to the places of residence or production is very short, and very few stations have to transmit it long distances.

With regard to the prospects of small-scale hydroelectricity projects in agriculture, we would like to boldly present some opinions:

At a time when we are experiencing an energy shortage, could not some places process part or all of their wood in the forests by using energy produced by small hydroelectricity stations with capacities of several kW to several hundred kW? By doing so we could use a form of energy that has been wasted for thousands of years but is being continually renewed. By doing so we will not only economize on POL, which we have long had to import, and have to import fewer diesel engines or gasoline-powered engines, which waste foreign exchange and require the use of expensive replacement parts, but will also save 40 percent of the corn husks that must be transported and fully utilize a considerable quantity of tree branches and tops that have laid in the forests for a long time. With the energy produced in forests we can saw wood and make wood items for local consumption, and later send them to the lowlands. With hydroelectric energy we can build such on-the-spot production installations as those producing wood pulp, pressed bamboo, plywood, etc., increase the wood utilization ratio, and increase the supply of goods by means of products produced in the forests.

In order to promote the construction of small hydroelectric stations it is necessary to have a factory which specializes in the production of small hydroelectricity equipment, or at least there must be a factory department specializing in that production. The quality of turbines is at present very low, the machinery is noisy and unstable, and the quality of drive belts is not ensured and they can be used only 2 to 15 days.

Perhaps the most important matter is that hydroelectricity produces for the future and does not take from the future. Each barrel of oil that is burned represents the loss of something for the future generation but each new hydroelectricity station adds to the supply of energy for future generations.

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

TRUONG CHINH DELIVERS SPEECH AT TRI AN HYDROELECTRICITY SITE

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Speech by Chairman Truong Chinh]

[Text] Dear comrades in the State Guidance Committee of the Tri An Hydroelectric Plant Construction Project,

Dear leadership comrades of Dong Nai Province,

Dear comrade Soviet technicians,

Dear comrades,

On this visit to the Tri An Hydroelectric Plant construction project, I happily relay to you, and through you, to all cadres, workers, and soldiers at the construction site, and to the Soviet specialists, the sincere salutations and warm greetings of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Dear comrades,

The construction of the Tri An hydroelectricity plant construction project has a very great significance. It is the first major socialist construction project in the south. It serves economic development and the improvement of the people's living conditions. It is a construction project which symbolizes the fraternal friendship, militant solidarity, and all-round cooperation between the parties and peoples of Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

It is also the first large project to be constructed in accordance with the slogan, "The state and the people work together, the central and local echelons work together." Continuing to build on the patriotic tradition of the liberation war period and bringing into play their socialist mastership spirit, the people of the south have enthusiastically and voluntarily contributed manpower and materiel to the construction of that project.

I was very pleased to learn that during the past several years, since construction began in 1983, you have made many all-out efforts, made many

outstanding accomplishments, and done a large volume of work with high productivity and good quality. Especially, you completed the construction of a bridge across the Dong Nai River in 15 months, thus surpassing the plan norm. Those accomplishments resulted from the spirit of all cadres and workers at the construction site in overcoming difficulties, coming forth with innovations, and improving management and techniques, with the inspiration of the love and care of the people. They are also results of the positive participation of the sectors and echelons. Those accomplishments have brought about for us strong confidence in the great potential and combined strength we may be able to develop in the future. Among those contributions, we will always remember the important contributions of the technicians who have worked selflessly, with a noble spirit of international proletarianism, and have brought to our people the intimate sentiment and friendship, and the heartfelt assistance, of the party and people of the Soviet Union toward the revolutionary undertaking of the Vietnamese people.

On this occasion I would like to warmly commend the accomplishments of all cadres, workers, and soldiers working at the construction site, and the sectors, echelons, and units participating in the construction and protection of the project, and to warmly praise the patriotic, revolutionary spirit and effective contribution of the people in our country and abroad. I would also like to send to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the fraternal people of the Soviet Union, and to all Soviet technicians working at the construction site, the sincere gratitude of the Vietnam Communist Party and the state and people of Vietnam.

Dear comrades,

We have taken the first difficult steps and have won a very encouraging victory. But we still have a great deal of work to do. The construction of the project's principal items demands a high level of organization and technology. We are facing new difficulties and challenges but we have many advantages. During the past several years you have gained much valuable experience in building a large, complicated project and your knowledge of science, technology, and economic management have been improved. You have always had the cooperation of the sectors and echelons and the inspiration, encouragement, and practical assistance of the people. You have continually worked side-by-side with the Soviet technicians, who are highly trained, are rich in experience, and have participated in the construction of large hydroelectricity projects.

Especially, the Eighth Plenum of the Party Central Committee recently promulgated a resolution intended to eliminate the bureaucratic-subsidizing system and completely change the economy over to socialist accounting and commerce. That is a resolution with a very great significance. You must study it carefully so that you can fully understand it and apply it to the actual situation of the construction site. The new policies regarding prices, salaries, and money, based entirely on socialist economics and commerce, will create favorable conditions for developing the economy and stepping up construction of the project along the lines of attaining the goals you have set, for attaining rapid progress, good quality, high labor productivity, and low production costs.

You must bring those basic advantages fully into play, modestly learn from the technicians, take the initiative, be creative, continually advance toward mastering science and technology, and endeavor to assume responsibility for the important tasks at the construction site.

In order to ensure the plan that has been set forth efforts must be made to bring turbine No 1 into operation by the end of 1987 and complete the entire project by the end of 1989. Beginning now, you must concentrate on fulfilling the following tasks well:

--Strengthening your sense of responsibility and consciousness of discipline, fully bring into play the socialist collective mastership right of the cadres and workers at the construction site, encourage everyone to compete enthusiastically in socialist labor emulation, develop innovations, rationalize production, improve techniques, and overcome difficulties in order to accelerate the construction rate and ensure the project's quality. You must promptly encourage and reward groups and individuals attaining high productivity, working with quality and innovation, improving management and techniques, and bringing about real effectiveness. You must resolutely oppose negative phenomena which exert negative effects on the construction schedule and the quality of the project and reduce the enthusiastic atmosphere at the construction site.

--Reviewing and balancing forces, doing a good job of organizing labor, practicing tight economic accounting, fully utilizing the existing capacity of equipment, on the basis of economic cooperation seeking the assistance of the sectors and localities, and effectively using the contributions of the people. The sectors and units participating directly in construction must manifest a spirit of socialist cooperation, positively mobilize equipment, machinery, and skilled workers, and coordinate the forces as effectively as possible.

--Being adequately concerned with the material lives and morale of the cadres and workers, ensuring the legitimate interests of the workers, and ensuring that everyone working at the construction site is healthy and works enthusiastically. Attention must be paid to ensuring that the technicians have convenient conditions so that they can contribute all of their talent and experience and help us do a good job of constructing the project.

--Organizing the protection of the project and paying attention to labor safety. The command and management cadres must closely monitor the construction site, always be present and firmly grasp the situation in all ways, improve their management effectiveness, and promptly deal with problems when necessary.

--Practicing absolute economy in production in order to reduce production costs. In the past there was often the viewpoint that economizing could be practiced only in enterprises, but that at construction sites, much of the labor of which is manual, is continually charging, and is made up of many forces, waste was accepted as practically a matter of course.

As we change over to economic accounting and socialist commerce, that viewpoint has been completely rejected. With the new management mechanism,

the requirement of economizing will emerge as an objective necessity. Firmly grasping that requirement, you must take the initiative in reviewing your organization and forces, eliminate the unnecessary intermediate steps and people, and review the norms in order to economize on materials, energy, raw materials, and labor, and rationally manage, coordinate, and use manpower and materiel in order to bring about great and real effectiveness for a construction site which has many workers and uses large amounts of equipment, raw materials, fuel, energy, materials, etc. By performing those tasks you can contribute importantly to forming and perfecting the new production mechanism in capital construction and in building large, complicated projects in our country.

The Tri An hydroelectric project is a key state project that is situated in a former war zone in eastern Nam Bo, in an area which was famous in two resistance wars fought by our people against France and the United States. In the past, the enemy studied the project but did not carry it out. Now we have begun the project and are certain to do a good job. It is a major project which will create conditions for us to develop our production forces, bring the light of socialism to the people, and create very good prospects for the continued construction of large projects in future years on the path of the nation's advance to socialism. Therefore, the construction of the Tri An hydroelectric project has very great political and economical significance, with regard not only to the region but also with regard to the entire nation. The sectors, echelons, and localities must fully understand that importance, positively provide assistance, seek all ways to provide the construction site with materials, equipment, capital, and labor, promptly help it resolve difficulties, and give it priority as a key state construction project. In recent years, because of a lack of completeness many construction projects in our country have had very low effectiveness, which has caused great waste for the people and the state. From that experience it may be concluded that in addition to the construction of that project there must be a plan to urgently complete it, to build electrical transmission stations and lines, improve the electricity grid of Ho Chi Minh City, and prepare to effectively receive and use the electricity produced by the Tri An power plant.

At the same time, within the framework of determining the economic development strategy of our country from now until the end of the century, it is necessary to examine the entire system of producing and supplying energy of the nation and of the south in order to have a plan for actively preparing for succeeding projects, as permitted by conditions and capabilities, in order to fulfill the increasingly greater requirements of the national economy and of society.

Dear comrades,

Energy is one of the foremost sectors of the economy. V. I. Lenin said, "Communism is the Soviet state plus national electrification." Our country is only in the initial phase of the period of transition to socialism, during which there must be accumulation for industrialization. Furthermore, according to international standards our country is classified among the countries with less than 100 kw of electricity per person, the minimum for an electrified country, but produces only 80 kw per person, so in our country the energy problem is even more important and urgent. Therefore, you are cadres

and workers who are building a hydroelectric project and have very great honor and very heavy responsibility. I am certain that with a spirit of socialist collective mastership, a seething revolutionary will, and ardent patriotism and love of socialism, you will develop the good points, overcome the deficiencies, attain even greater accomplishments in the future, fulfill your glorious missions, endeavor to build the project with high productivity, quality, and effectiveness, surpass the plan norms, and contribute to outstandingly fulfilling the admonition of our beloved Uncle Ho, "After defeating the U.S. bandits we will develop more than 10-fold over the present."

With that belief, I sincerely wish all cadres, workers, and soldiers at the construction site, and the Soviet technicians, good health, happiness, and victory.

Thank you.

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CSO: 4209/646

POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

NEARLY 178,000 PEOPLE SENT TO DEVELOP NEW ECONOMIC ZONES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Aug 85 pp 1, 4

[Article: "During First Six Months of Year Nation Mobilizes Nearly 178,000 People To Develop New Economic-Population Zones"]

[Text] According to the Labor Transfer Department of the Ministry of Labor, the provinces mobilized 177,914 people to develop the new economic-population zones, including 84,783 workers. A total of 45,028 people, including 23,068 workers, were sent from the Bac Bo lowland provinces. Three provinces fulfilled their annual labor mobilization plans 6 months before the deadline: Lang Son, 323.6 percent; Ha Bac, 203 percent; and An Giang, 25 percent of the plan norm. The provinces which fulfilled 60 to 85 percent of their state plans included Ha Son Binh, Bac Thai, Thuan Hai, Ben Tre, Thanh Hoa, and Song Be.

Ha Son Binh is a province with much good experience in expanding the scope of mobilization, providing centralized, uniform guidance from the provincial level down to the village level, creating a seething movement among the masses, mobilizing the strength of the entire population to participate in the distribution of labor and population, and doing a good job of organizing the movement of people to develop the new economic zones. Within a period of only 5 months the province sent 3,507 families, totalling 16,013 people and 8,222 workers, from the lowland districts to develop the economy and society of seven mountain-region districts. At a time when the central-schelon capital set aside for population transfer in the province was 3.8 million dong, the province used nearly 30 million dong in local funds to support that work. At the new economic zones in Ha Son Binh, nearly 1,400 hectares of land have been cleared and brought into production, including 253 hectares of cajuput, 138 hectares of peanuts, 734 hectares of manioc, 177 hectares of corn, and many other crops, such as sugarcane, tea, alpinia, etc.

The localities and units were able to do a good job of distributing labor and population first of all because the party committees and governmental administrations exercised centralized leadership and carried out the four contents at the new economic-population points: doing a good job of studying, zoning, and preparing the area; shifting labor at the right times in the production season; preparing the infrastructures at the places receiving population in advance; and organizing production well from the beginning.

However, in general the labor distribution plan has been implemented slowly nationwide: only 36.9 percent of the plan norm regarding population and 43.3 percent of the plan norm regarding labor were attained. The movement has not developed uniformly. A number of provinces attained low levels: Tay Ninh, 21.06 percent, and Vinh Phu, 21.6 percent. The forestry sector needs many workers but it received only 24.8 percent of the workers called for by the annual plan. Therefore, the requirements of the transferring of labor and population during the last 6 months of the year are still very great. Only with the efforts of all relevant echelons and sectors will it be possible to fulfill the 1985 plan norms.

Although the harvest of this year's fifth month-spring rice crop is 20 days slower than normal, by 7 August Thai Binh Province had completed the transplanting of its entire 10th month rice area and is endeavoring to attain a yield of 30 quintals per hectare.

In order to prepare the soil rapidly, at the beginning of the season the province sent to the basic level 20 additional new tractors and sold more than 10 to the cooperatives. In comparison to the previous season, during the present season Thai Binh has more than 40 additional tractors and has increased the area plowed and harrowed by machine to 25,000 hectares.

By mid-July the agricultural materials sector completed the shipment of 13,500 tons of nitrogenous fertilizer, 10,000 tons of phosphate fertilizer, and 100 tons of insecticide to the basic level. Thai Binh guided the expansion of such quickly maturing rice varieties as CR 203, which was planted on 40 percent of the area and the Moc Tuyen variety, which was transplanted on 50 to 55 percent of the area, and reduced the ratio of the Bao Thai variety to 9 percent.

Because of steady rain the transplanting rate was rapid. The districts of Dong Hung, Thai Thuy, Quynh Phu, and Hung Ha completed their transplanting early and have completed the first weeding cycle.

The cooperatives have completed the elimination of insects from rice seedlings and gathered 30 tons of rice hispa. The vegetation protection network in the districts was strengthened with additional personnel and insecticides in order to eliminate insects as soon as they are discovered.

The district drafted plans for draining water in low-lying areas and high-lying areas and test-operated water drainage pumps. The province drained water from the drainage canals and strictly regulated the closing and closing of sluice gates.

By 8 August Hai Hung Province transplanted 114,000 hectares of 10th month rice on two-crop rice land and fulfilled its plan norm regarding the planting of 10th month rice. All 12 districts and cities in the province fulfilled their area plan norm, including Chi Linh and Phu Tien districts and the city of Hai Duong, which surpassed their seasonal area plan norms by from .6 to 2 percent.

Overcoming difficulties caused by the late harvesting of fifth month-spring rice, prolonged heat, serious drought, baked soil, and insufficient water

pumps, the province promptly took steps to ensure sufficient water and sow sufficient rice seedlings. The tractor sector concentrated 432 tractors to plow high-lying fields and water-deficient rice fields, and used tractors with wire cage wheels to prepare the soil in marshy fields. The area plowed by machine amounted to 50 percent of the seasonal area and attained the highest level ever.

The province distributed electricity on a rotational basis to 330 water pumping stations, retained water in ponds, lakes, canals, drainage ditches, and low-lying fields, and opened some sluices passing through dikes to obtain alluvium in accordance with the slogan "obtain rapidly and drain rapidly," in order to transplant the 10th month crop and irrigate the high-lying fields.

Implementing Resolution 8 of the Party Central Committee on prices, salaries, and money, during the present season the agricultural service corporations are operating more effectively, have a stronger sense of responsibility toward the fields, and have sent materials and fertilizer to the basic level more promptly and in greater quantities than during previous seasons. Thanks to the spreading of five to six tons of manure per hectare, good tending of rice seedlings, the spraying of insecticide before transplanting, and the supplemental fertilizing of additional nitrogenous fertilizer, the rice quickly took root and is developing well. The Gia Tan and Phuong Hung cooperatives in Tu Loc district, the Tan Dan cooperative in Chi Linh District, and the Hai Tan and Thanh Binh cooperatives in the city of Hai Duong completed the transplanting of 10th month rice during the best part of the seasonal schedule, have completed the first weeding of the early 10th month area, and are exploiting all sources of water to irrigate each rice planting.

Hai Hung Province has launched an emulation campaign to tend and retain sufficient water for each of the rice plantings, has fully utilized rice seedlings to transplant additional seedling plots, and has completed the transplanting of 10th month rice on jute fields, to commemorate the August Revolution and National Day in a practical manner.

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